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"a. wllling to prophMy tbatpo.c.aaul11.e Prac. tlev1d . .t be
lnelb,edCO d . . lsc '''1I'0Il PUNU1nl. within the ........ of
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the hope of .chle....nt. 39

differeate,.
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The

l1e t.n the obj.ctive.

_,,01'
bu~
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The major diff.rence is th.t d. Caulle bel1eve. he
e.n for the fir.t t1lle .lnce the .ar _bl1i•• beh1nd
• policy of national greatn... the many In,redl.nta of
French power her.tofor. antaloalatle.l1y .rr.yed
a,alnat each other. The great que.tion now become.
whether unlty and .acriflee co lona be bIpoMfI on eh.
French peopl., ev.n by a .an endowed with the charl••
utle aura . f the twlce-over .arior of 'ranee. 40

In the fac ••f ext...i " critici•• whlch i. occ •• loaally
l.veled at d. Oaul1e and hl. pollc1••• lt 1. worthwhl1e to
al.o ....In. a crltlque of aau11i.. wh1ch hal bean for.u1.ced
by .n .vowed a.inr ••uch a. that r-..dered by Maurl.ct

Thi. wa. Gaulll•• •• contributlO8 to ..... It
llalply corr•• pond. to the factI' .ach nation 1.
powerful aftd ab•• lut.t with lt8 unique e~r.cterl.tlc ••
pa8liona. virtu••• _dn •••• aenius •••• different frOll
~ other a. on. hu.an belna 18 fro. .noth.r •••• rranc.
a. a nation i. brtmmtns wlt6 po•• ibll1tl.. which French
advocat•• of "'ricaa h....oay continue to d.n,. ov.rtly
or covertly. And yet in the Cllplomatic r.al. de G.ulle
J

,
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haa demonatrated the intact power France once asain
po•••••••• and h. h.. don. 10 with per.ua.lv. fore.
incr.ased tenfold by the fact that the maneuver was
executed woty yean aft ... the .....t •• t dl••• ter I.n
our history, and durlng the very year. that have aeen
the llqulciatiOll ••• of our 8IDplre.

That the French

aatioa haa recovered It. Place regained it. fr••dOll
of action. that lt toclay polarl ••• the hope of the
world outalde the bloc •• Under luch condltlons and
d•• pite the unchalleng..bl. po.itlon atomic "',ona
have given Sovlet Russia and the thd.ted Stat...-thb
..an. that aa.lll.. la 1... a doctrin. than a .ucc... ful
experlment, a v.rificatlon, a confirmation by the facti
of a certa~ way that ___"hlld Charl.. de Gaulle had
of thinklng about Franee •

.
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DB GAULLE'S THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
., WbeCh. . . . . .11. . . . . . . ., lM_et._l ,.lltle.
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. . lled . .blt~) but racher with tb.

ud.e~~ted

realttie.

whleh .re h.-ft, nat10aal artd conaequatl, la,enatt.oraal.-a
'lb.. . vbeD de Gaulle 11 told th.t the eXfNlDlt.oallt tendenot•• of

Ru.,la an • threat to V01l1d peace. he must allo be inclined to
eonsldel' _bOh tendeact.••• a1thGUIIl 1... obvtoue. which .1g"l
belona to' the UIIltect Stat... . Th.,.ltualloll ,. • ,owe... 'ruBBle
'01'

which the .... ponalbl11t"<WtU.t be dlrided.' '. Bach Mtl....late.

t.a the .,.••• f d.O.ul1e, partlcipate. 1n international politics

as though it weren 'l'en• • f·con~llee •••aehc.JI'imaall,.
temptinl 10 ...'el•• ie.

Each poll.tlcal
,

,~

.~

ec.....Ch .a,th. expa••• f·~e ether••

1.~.t:ah~p;Il""
w"

:."

!.

> •

.t.-

"~

la ...... of natloaa1

~W.r.ct.ons
,

and 1t 1. _1, _ _ a. eqoftllbrt._> of power 18 ••tatillahed that
interna' ..... l;·~ri 'oan .,. aocOIDpl1aW. 4

0. Oaa11•. hae ... f . ._

to·_• • • cnaadU ta lntftutlonal

politic. lor a ,.I'It.calar·Weol.,ical ayae_,, r.thet"M'b......
lerted tbat

"h'.~.""ly ,acknowledges

the world as it' 1s.

f.'

le11y po...... out tba"bu Gaul1i•• IIOticm.' the •. .ld .... ' tt

1."

flo.. aot eeft'upOrld . . . . . .rll,.t. the • .,. CM.,..,.td ."urs

...

t~..

i"

F •

.;

i:$I'or

i

Rath... ,i'tIUI't be oOMtdered 1ft the c.-ext . .
_...

'T

'

..

"'. ,;'

f.

2. . Caul1., "CbbthPr••• Coafq;aace, n J"l,. 29, 1943.
6ddl"s"t~ p. 237. .
.

3Eugen~ Weber. "An Anxious Pride:

French Policy, 1959,"

GII"_ lIi.ega. V()l. 36 (M,,..19S9). p•. 27S.

~C"Wl.t ItOe G&1Ille'. , . .lan Pollcy, Jf
'de Ga\J11.....tnth ~. OoltferenQe
aa'o, Add"'
••I. p. 2$8.
.

t

It

p,,.

17.5-176.

January 31, 1964,
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d. Cedlt.'. coneept of the nation-atate.

regal'da tlleworld
,lat.nt for hi'll

,

to

~o
.

Since the General

be multtple . &ftC! national, C~t

VOltt. he'."

"lard the,·WO'tld •• ,_":I.,-I.bI8" .... ., ···.h•••
,

"

)

"

"

,

natlons which are . .t supupowh'a. 6
Perhaps tbe, ~~lt:l.t
.
",

"

fo~l.p
.

pOlley shew, fa.,

\IlOft

lMlaht

';'

tary on for.lan polley 1. aeeepttW.'
(,

A wo~"l. "eJrellb pelley ean ...., " •• ta'le. Itt
fOl'ilUtael.tiOllel•• t,<tt~I'.~"'.17 telta.p 1a mlnd
ehac baC-.rqtlonal . eOftdltlodj tl'_"-tt 11f81 .... lubj~ • •o . . . .ntehaaj•. aM .t"•• , eo ·~tlda po'e, .. Che
",.ll.,ltht .II~ . . II aft tltul1cm tha, ean 0,,1, lead
~';:mh ":;!i~:; t like,

::..:!·t.'r;.Ta;.7J:;ftet

."l•••-.e••

'b• •

.

,:or

''''lIt:·~''.'''.''.'''.'''~tr.'••e•..

..... oft_. C~" ftOC ,; .~.~.It.,.. "-lftt. .,,~.,.f
IIISKi
lDI4.l. ; tamawtat ad 'caa t4lid to a ,.'•• hH' . . .th. '.
tfil'1 ..all itobe tlteM aftt.'l.elated 1••uea. Problems
of lnt'r.natlq~ relatlo" an lnte~~ec:t.d ....4,. .-arely
eaftone tsn_ be e. .I...... 1ft . . .eu.. tft olhe _rds t
f .... t.an polu" ~. bee. . t.nt~ontlnent .. l pol1c1 and ••
• •1\ I. lftdl.1.1bt.~J~
".
.
'.
.

It ls

t,.

~l••

th18 .C'CIIIIII. notlen of 1",....tl __ 1 "latlons

to wht.eh de Caudl. ohjeetecI.

Act!Oribl& to V~ft'. th_ first

t •• k which de Oaulte 1ft' f~ ht...lf "hen he

resat""',,..r was

to rid hi1leelf .el the 1.,_lOsln Whieh had -.rged 'f'er Wel'l.
War Twtt adwhleh prejudleed the peal110ft ef PYaae. in ....ld
.,fain. 8 Tho•• ' let_logt.. . 'tt'hleh COftf'h'mtetl , . Gaulte...,.
U I

.d

~Kel1)'."F.....h a.......t.oa .f HUtoq,,!' p., 641.

';otdOftt ~ld.ttI -. tJalg blI.C!. p. 13.
SJ.eg~•• vernantL"rcmdernent. et Objectlf. de ~a Pol1tlque

Exterieur. n.ea's •• -

mlUIauIUM.C'

(1963). p • •59.
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tI.,..... a.

1.11ft1.",

1) La 1IOIlti. . ., clivi. . . . deux paw ... 1u"., flUi

marqueralt cette seconde moitle du XX. sieele. entre 1&
tlocl,lo.'. llbe"11••• ",olt.'iq... et ,'O.lle d" ....l'••I'. .me
cOmmuniste. t'OeeldentCfolt. en consequence.' regrouper
•••.•0 ..0 • • •, ...1811.s •• '_ral•• , ."n·cl• • •ppo••r .u
as.auta dfuft adversaire qui agit tanCot par 1& ruse,
,ui....., .. plan " .., ••lb.ft .de loaaue·halelM. 'u. , ....
sequence practique de cetta coneeptlon manlcheenne eat
. - ,.,. ""'.....e 1, ..'I.cta.'ee 4utaOl'l'elib.. .. fa..
del'.dversalre ne peat que lavarller sea entreprlaes.
'. '.:

.a)

c..c.

~lvt.lo,,'"

.,... ••10a de• . . , . ,1n..

loglquu antagonist •• s'aceompagne dtune repartition bi-

polaire de 1a puissance politlque. militaire at
econamlque ••••
3) CeI'.11.~cSu ,el. . prbaclpel' .nonces ci-dessus
••• on c. . i . . .i..o..."".......t
.a.la.
.
a) ';" 18. puissances coloniales europeennes que
1a l1.quWat . • •.1AUu .,..lCle.. Ou-...M... ;mettalt _
, ..... ··1' ill 1. . . . '•• lA "'l'Opole dana lea terrltolres
i .....

qut

d.P4IOd.....' d'.U.... '"

.",

",*

. "

.

..
b).,.r 1. . . . . oo.ld....·l d~ .·..,..,••••1. . . .
s.. 11<ltAd
,4.,S;tWlu..,, __. .__leain. 4_ 1. .

'tt!
... 'Mo• . . t..P1~!,_",,~P&...s.. aee....~e.
1 a~"ts..:. 1 .. f1........ev1rt. . . ., ... ..,pea

44u. 1 ,"pI..~'i.o.,

., ......1....

." ,

S1nce the war the £1111,'1.11 ot international politics

have chanaad; or at least the 'r•• Uent ot France belleves that
they have ·'chlna.d. 'A. a re.ult. de Gaull. hal cOme to re~ard
..
.

01 ~.r'as unn~turalJ precarious. and
unwise. to nel1evtng that the world is on the threshold of
the pr•• 8l'lt balance

re~

.hull1ement regardlni intemational a1ilanee~, deG.~lle's task
11 at once apparent to htm.
guido thetr operation.

He must understand theae, forces and

To do this it 1. necessary to loeus

aeeentlon on fheperenn1al'·utlc.mal corittt.ct'that he believes
b

•

$

••

It.

Db

•

1

J

J

I.A

•

I

•

9V~4nt.

EXt.rl~

"Poftdementl at Object1t. de 1a Pol1t1que
......1••• ~pp,.4Sge60.

10Maeridls. nDe Caulle's 'oreign Policy,ft p. 176.
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r.1a.,.....· ..ween.

pl....,..th.·mutual

hav.......... ..

4Revlr",,1.....

and the aecession to full sovereignty of dozens of
•

t'

,'"

-

j',

••

.,

•

F $

.-

n

.,$

I, '

t 't

.,"

F

•

,

_"

.1

••• ,

."

.,'

••••

$

, l~Mi:el'lcfll. "Dcf ajutte'g P'oretgn Polley," p. 118.

12D.w•• ,. 176._

lly.rmant. "PelI.Cl,•• ixl.rlau... hancal••• u PP. 460-61.
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' ........1,. eol6nind countr1..

baa,

toda".bul1t aDev WH'ld

equll1briue. . . .ured1,. .ore, .e.ble tbaD Ih._ of the 'COl. w.... 14
In a .t.cement at MOfttbel1ard in 1962 ••8 Gaull. a.ld.
Cea peuple. at c.a Etats de l'lurope dolvene.
enaamble, oraaniser 1. cooperatlon at la pratlquer, en
... d ••rti....- • WI en,"-'...ta ••" .tt...
t .... ernel, qui ne peut pas ne pas produlre aea affecs sur 1.a
,..ple. d. ll_twe eo.e d1l rid ••• de
C•• ,..,l•• -la
lont laaenaaraent deslreux de trouver 1e moyen 1m Jour

,..t.

l....

" .I,tr.a....... f ...ttma!!l_C ..... d ••
aont eC que neus aommea.

h_.

fI"'11s

,

Thla coneepclon of the btamatlonal sltuation wherein the fonter
foe. are regarded. as

posalb~e

future a111es haa been a major

tenet of Gaulllat foreign policy from it. inception.
~'

As early as

f

1959, de Gaulle vaa preaching thia view.
"

'.

Doubtl •• a Sovlet Ruaas.a although having helped
ae..aal_ ...... ..t.blbhW I.Ja ChUla, r_1t_ ,tha' '
ftOthlng can prevent lt, Ruella, a white Eul'Opean natlon
wlHh baleolMla...ed 'pan. ofA' ...... la· ....c. i.· . .
well endowed wtth land, m1ne8. faccories, and wealth·. .thLnI oan'ita.pell te pl"fte8t ie ,..- haY11l8to nek01l
with tfie yellow multltude Which 18 China--numberle.8 and
...tebecl17 poor. l.t1d..tNCtlble and
bdl....
by dtnt of violence a power whlch cannot be kept wlthln
lielea ... l_klDgawnmcl at ;-the _ ...... over _t.ch i. '
mulC one day spread. 16 ---

't.

_tti.tou_.

Perhaps more sisnlflcant 18 the French reallzatloll (even
.

"

,".

if premature) that the Soviets are no longer antieipating a
t ..

take-over 1ft EUI'ope.
•

"

(I

l

In fact. recent year. do not reveal any

r •

L

••

n

1~ut"1a. douve de Murv111e. 'ftFrenehPoliCY Today,
AtIU'" c. . .a.c;r9Mrs.&:lx.Vol. 2 (W1Dt,l'. 19644!1'6Sl. 11.616.
1'..,..17. 1962;' louacl I.lt ,",gerM_tp, DI SiII'~1 .11
tf

, - _ (Pa'la,

,F~~.

"1963). p. 186.

'

16de Gau11., "Seeoad ha•• Coafe....a•• u N..,... 10, 1959.
HI~u Addl...... p. S8.
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signiflcant Soviet threat. or otfenaive 1nit1atlves.

The

'rench. therefore, whether coneet or flOC I.n cheir judgment.
de,=ermlned that the time was ripe tor new approaches to foreign

poltey.I'
Another lundamental of Gaulll.t loreip pollcy 1. tlte

evaluation of the pre.ent world .ltuatloft a.' being .dr_ly
precarious. 'Tf1eeontlnuousbrlnkconltionttDg Mth lar•• and
.mal1 nations 18'. dinger' which ~at be cSt.pacen_. la The fear
revealed in chiacone.pt01 the unexpetted la.t.o a patrent.1
charactwtaticof the General', pollticAI thought.

In hl.

memolI's the aener.ilreealled bt. deterftllnatlon of April, 1942,

when he declared

'lshttag

that

pt~e. would .tand by her

al1t••

her. ttl. cOileen. • • the
reeognlttOn of .the Vichy lover_aile by thoae uelotll auJ)1tOIWly
dedicated to democrattc prlnelpl... A. eart,
ehb etate .
on the cOndition that they ltarad by
.

'

"

';_ ..'.

".

,'f.

.1

' , ' ,

de Gaulle, reallzlngthat' "raneeh*fbeeft betrayed 6yber ruting

ela.s, looked rONaN to the revolut1on Whteh he hoped to accom-

lYe reallzed, hCn,~r. that tM supftrpOWen could not be
trus ted to guaratee the peace.' He' COile lu4f1d bt, .....rk. by

p1ish.

warning that the .ltuaeta would belntolerabl. "t.f !be .••It.'

'.

,".

!

.

>

styled realism that, from ~. Municl. to another, fl•• led liberty

to the very edge
Ii

ot the abyss vere'to eemtlnue to impole upOn

•

17MaUl"lce COUftde Mttnllle, "'lb. Role of Frane.,"
6IlID'&I ilamJ.I' g,lIr,g&1 (St.IIIIIMll', 1964), p. 2S8.
1~•• ''D. G.at41e t .Foret,p 'olley," p. 146.

i
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I
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ardour and to betray saerlflce •••• "19
In de Gaulle's attempt to realistically ..aluate ,he

world-sltuation, he has continually believed in the need ¥hloh
great powersba.,. to perform some wo1:1d tlle,l01h
utopias are fundamental to thelr ideololl.s.

SpacJ,o\sl

Th~ y ....

of ex-

perienee have t.usht de Gaulle to be somewhat d~atftltful of the
residual cbauvJ.nil1ll which masquerades tatder I1beral ld8010,l•••
This chauvinls. 1e., ayraptOMtlc
of an lnterutlon.' hi"1ult,._
.
.~.

Thie haa become a predominant tear of h'tnCh pol1cy-mat<eI'8 1a
. .eat , ..re and bas reau1ted t.a de Gaulle's deten.J.Mtloa 10
end the dual . .atery of the .uperpowera. 20
The most 1Male factor which haa cOIlpelle4 de Ga-.11, t.
"

,

reject I'M

~lOft

~.

, ' ,

.1 bipOlarity ,tl,.tel
~Olt1;rt.~t
••
laCfte
..
.."
.' .co
.
,~'

.'

,

.,'

'

~

'.

natlcmalhMtorit 'It eo\ttd .11110._..... s.td "that
NC~ '.·blpolJl..
. .
.'

~

framewo1'li itt no1t"lftt .,re . " .

ten.l._. .'11
..

War

I '

,""

8ft

,

.

'

lnaCltutl.oul1Qt1f'l\ .,. Cold
.

1,

"

att_etftlf t'Oftea.saeevt.tft 'all:_1elpacs

ln the WOI'ld pQlltlca1 areu. de Gavlte hopei

~o

resCOJ,"8.tM

no~t eonditlqns of .tradltl~l dlplomacy.!1

found dlat.a.tetulltl .the
wblchltdlaplqad. 17

One ethel' ele.entWbleh. de OIftdle
pnt8ftt

Nlaee . . the laek of .'Wi. . .

allowl.nl two

ft8ftOftl~h. United

Stac.. and the Sovl:at UIll.on...·

each of wb10b .o.u11..... leI....... INa j\lll........... of the
db J

•

btl

J

,

l'de oaulle t ~'D, pp. 25(1).'1.
20Kelly. MPreneh Restoratlon of HI..tory," pp. 644-45.

2r Vernaftt • ·polttlque Qcterleure P'rancals.," pp.' 461';'62.

•

r
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world ee.aunity. ",.aI"01.a Ufll'a..... bad he.-lI7t Cbs J.a••~.
dene. ami 11.....ly, •• WOI'14 ,.l"lea ...... " ..,..ralz... !2

the

French "s.aHbolh .f Ih......ii'"eal It.. . . . . . ~expel'l. .ed

lmpa."._ .....uaon. 'a..

1 .•f •• g •

and

>

'

..u.'.: grad •••1p

In_l.... , ah. ,......1 coaaoll.d4*I.Oft of Etaope, . .tual1, 'canee's
'.
plue in chi. Iaopewould b. eenual.11le leu, tbe. . .f~be
,

1*"_.

Gaulll......

agree to.

oen.-. , .......

deli.a1t~v.ly

*hqe lW ,..,.... ,,111

clivi.1Im.f I~,..~·J).· 0-.11_....

the

other

hand, hopes to organb~e aDd lead a more traditionaldlplomatie

cour.e a~ thu. NUnita
Europe.!3 tht. f.ar: w~.'expYe'.ed l1t
,
,
hi. eighth preas confereneel
,

••• the United ScateaWh't.c.'h •• inc.•. Yalta and potad_.
l1li'. 'hal
..... _ . af•• 411, co Nk ~,the Sovt..et •• tAe,U....ted
State. aee. tempting prospeets openbl& up before !.t'.
H. . . . l_ '..acanc.. · .•ll tbe·....,.r.ce ...ot1atloaa. between
the =lo-saxoftl and .the sO.neca whteh. 8t1l.rt. lfts.·,wlth, the
lltd:_,e. .t .n ,..1...
a. . lite1p to be
extended to other que.tiona, bOtable E\JrOpeall • •a. until
_ . ,eM . . . . . ' of . . ~••
01"1'17
•••1l'IIt the vi... of F'rauea.

,t;._•.

.,a•

_"eh

',',

•

l

.,

,..

\

~

At an even .arlt.er date, de Gau118 wa even morepe8.1m18tlc,
.,,", ' Prob~blY 'the.ort ol8qul11b~lUID that'l.' .. ta~
lb~·llH1t ...._ _ ·Ohe ......0 .,..,..of eM ··CWO. '-1'.
t.., for the
moment t • factor 1n world peace, but who ean
_II :\haPJ*l . ____~ Wb.o . . . .",.,... ~1 ••
whether .ome sudden advance In davelopment.-partteular1y
1..... f'elel o • •pue· ........~t.11l1OCpro.w. OM with

.., .n

22MMridll. HDe Gaul1. 'a renelp '-110)'

.ft" Jh 1~6..

...

, '.'. 23,Ed,~,rS. Fu1!'nl•• ,,,.~r. t,~tTh. c;rand ne.1p of Chari •• de
;:~11'3=.,f.a£D'. ,Owtrt1r..x ~~.. Vot. 40, (Sprln:~. 1984). " "

,', ,;14". cali11., ·I~th Pr••• CoJ1fw8ftee. It July 29. 1963.
til,." " " '..... P. US..
",
" .
..

II, ,
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.uch an actftt\••S.ehat ttl r-tcefttl lftellttaelOft. will not
hold out? Who can say whether I 1n the futu't'e J 1f ba.ie
political I.e. . .bout" ehangltcompletely, iI' naa alnady
oecured on the earth. the two powu. that would h4" a
IIOMPloy onmael-eat:' Vctapon8 ftti~t not _ke .d_1 wleb
each other to divlde the world betw. . them? Who ca• • ay
. . .h ..., .hCM.ild ehe Gee•• lon dd.......td.l. each .ide might
follow a pollcy of nothurl1ng it. device. at the prtn01,.1 eclvefta..,.,
1tOt: to be tbfta.ttlned by l'• ...who
ean .ay whether the ~ rivals might not crush others?
an. oan ~ well imagine, for example, that on
such a terrible occaslon, Western europe mlght be
de.ft014k1 fliCml ~8ftd 'C-.cnlluropefl"Otft "'••hblgton.
And who can ,lay whether the two r,ival'l a. a re.u1t of
bl. polltte.! and:!r:t.a upheaval. wl11
not come to the p'olnt of unlti118?
..,

'0 ••

..... tIn'.......

After aa.e•• ing t!,e present. power bala'QC. .• and flnding it . to ,be
inadequate, de Gaulle has concluded that Franee could once aaain
become a major

tn

in~luence

world affairs.

The.

cause

or ~k1nd

was a ••umecI by Prance and. acting under the gutse of thl.$ ideo1"

'

':~

,

,,-"

.

,

:

, '

pr08~••

ogy, de Gaulle hoped to pursue. the, ,!!ause of peace.

'f and

and worl"acMl~.....e." 1ft ,~er~,. eOtltrlbUt'e :f!O" the .....~......lng
of oppeal',lOft ·and.

contft.t'or

the b1l'Olar wor~~f he' ~dft1:00k a

policy e*ll1ng tor the
multlptleatton
of diplomati.e
Te,t.tiona.
...
,r ,
.~<"
,,~i
"~
'

,

thus lt WO\Ild

"

lt~ "',1..,1.) ateordl.fls ' . de

a.ulle' "tflat in this
way the aoule of __ • ..,.,....r they .." be' ~n hls earth, wll1
·f·

..'

.

"

meet a 11~tl• •"'~ at the' ~.~s;tftat,

..1

.'

.

-;

.*_

tmivane .... 'htMCtred ,aM
of liberty.

tt,.

.

"

~

,

.~".tlw

"

'\

....

Pranee,aw; the'
.

,..ars aPt

t~e'~.tVtn.ts

fraternity • .26 .

In hle • •l_t ..... of the Cold. War eltuatten. tune••
WIF

tiljgl:

•

2'4eGaulle, "Second Pre•• CODference, I. Novemb~r 10, 19.59,
..
.

6fWaa•••• · p. 61.

2.4e (:.,,11., "Nlat), hess Conference," January 31, 1964,
MaSDE 6ddElI.,•• p. 2S8.
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noted. that Europe ha. aot only _de. nemenf!ou' ...lIOtaU
recovery t but al.o i. today. less harried by ominou. soundinas

from the East.

A significant factor 1n

thi~

lessening of tension

Com.

is the conclusion of the treaty limiting nuclear testing.
•

•

y

.'

plimenting this. the Russian military offenslve has become le.s
credlble to Western Europe.27
'ftl8H ••• be 1l.ttl• ..,.te..,., ' ......for •••hroudSnI the
,"

,

"

,

~

policy.............f .d. caalle, whl.ch c&a1lo. be ,end!'a'" t.'tbey
i

'.

",

, ' -

are eon.i• •Min ·the light of _bt.. pel111c.l ,Id.lo••"".
;".

~,; \'.:,~'

(

<

l'

""

General.s Hpeatedly
;

.~

i

>,

'

The

"

a..te4th.1 .-. Nll..... 'IUt ·1fOJlldtlOlt.tics

0 . " . ,

~

....

were d •• tbed. for new direction. and that international align"

ments n..... 'o
"," J

M,~"~,,,Ce4.

oae

bclka..r 'of thl.. ... to

' "';

eu 'in'eraalftM1'der . f

be found b
~,

'.

"

.;.~~'

",:,

"'

tbe ,.talt.t...,.a 'bl• •

"

00_"'.'.
1

a..

,

• '

<
.. fa" •• ttae:cotaltea1.. . power. ue
I.. . . . . . ohiou CO ... · . . .t,·'. .h ''"ta01l1a1!'~'fI'01''II''''
.If...... t. llltan'" to a1afta
tIN. 'te au.tn...
the 'Weat.ht faG. .
we ... '.ppnetAtetn. ,tn. . . .l'difft.cat.l•• ,......teHd .", th... leacl••• 'b all
lhe'dfOrt.t!Ml.1.~• .aktas. ettherto'1IIpOee . . Ih.,
peopl.. ". aya• • """h
·eotIWal7 ...........tll"t~. , ..tee . . . . leeft\Mdon•. Ita ehat .".t. wh1eh are, little
by little{. being demanded by the rise. of n.ew •.1. ite. and
,,·,the _ .. eat
the ._,• • ' ." . " ' , . ' .
.
~or are."e unaware that in their campa th• • truggle

"'.l•••• :
'S

'presa_" .,

~. =:t:'l~r!)~t~=ip:~~~~:t~'::'i~!-rm;l:~ble

011.e ............ '. . .q_t..... eMIl 'whe•• · . . .-.1.0"""",_
--cannot help but unsettle them. Moreover."e know that
.' ,in C1utN ........t.uCMre . . . ocmftl.dt.. . . . .10. .1
&ftc.. 1ft spite of the absolutism of their ideology. We
aallae. tberefor."QIllycoo. well that... the,. xeadUi lDdu1ga
1a virulent utteranees and sensatlonal outbursts 1n order

.t1....
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to le3d people astray·-wlthln their own country and tit.ld•••wlth"" t however t . . .enteppllll _.tata bouaf1••

a.

1ft . . . . . . . . .8ftC t ••, . .

la the . a . yet., Couw de·Mu:"i.lle

_,,",'" 1ft .... . . . poettl_ tet:Ma tb., ¥letICNl. the ' ...neh

hadtakelt t!egardlftl what ha. fYequtltl1 "'n called • Uth...' 1n
the blteh&tlolaal , . .leu •.
'.
. In the £a.t., ~ is ....1.tlaled bf' ebe c...
frontatlon between China and RUI.t.aJ chi. 18 a real
nault flra' of " .•ppOIJtclOD fJf . -....1
lnterest. Which goea
far
the traditional frontier

...,tun...
CMmflloU_

.ae

M_.., .......

a.

a.

oe.ntrl.. ef £H,em,. Btd!'ope baYtltake

advantage of thls by apeediftg up an already noticeable

1.- 1...

--.1s-tt.oa ·.aclJ by ,~ iA a. . .
way that the dlaparaging label of .8,ellita is becoming •

. wl;th ttdI . ..,ti.eJI: oflaat OeaMrtY.
and
tifled.
, , :, ' 1ft t:hiI W••• , to ...e" deall"a~,. th_ .re

jaa.

1lO' ~

fllcta. Mptttl'~t:yfil. the underlrlng lntere.ts
remain mutua.
• a lanc. i. a rea lty and a nee.s.ity
recognized by everyone. But this solidarity on the
lUftd...ntale do. not l)r8Wtlt), the auto.atkalla-.t·
of the paat from having bec~ an anachronism. and little
by little aftd to dt!ferant d_sreea, 1t does JIOCJ)hVent
aome members from rediscovering their personality and
. chair ,fre.... o! aclion. The. 11IIC'UJralnaultt. of the
eeonomic re-establishment, the consequenee of a solution
ta, which ehe thr.a.~"wt1:hout'be1hg -..ah 1e•• ftal, haa
become more diffuse I, is an awal<eniDi: at least to the
, .1M8d Co find thella.we. onoe,aga1n.~'
, ' ;.
, The P\-anc:h .... not: ,;tbeonlyOD" .to haft

p8J:C:(ti'Vfld '.

01\*'88 lb abe' i.naem.tloaal arena." "81eZ••inakt. .haa ·••• ,eeI hl.

cO'lWi".lon that

cheSon. t7ntcmha. 1ft .eeent ,.an h.,0118 sus-

ce"tlbl.cocbe aetraetf.l:tn; of

E..,..
t'

HI';'

Ii

Heconald...d the former
It

IT

~8. . Cau11., --rbb'd .Prese ConI.......... S.pt. . . . S', 1960,
Add"",
•• pp. 84.85.

%~uric. Couve'de HUnille, "The ~ole ot 'ranee," '
ACl.ne",.,....,.,,! 9Ml1'Bb •••1.2 (S1amntew'. 1964) ·,p,2.56.
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attitude of the

the one hand, arrogantly ta1kln$

~usslanl-.on

of Mosca. as a "third Rome;" on the other hand. revea11ng a
sellse of deep-rooted lnferlorlty to the West.

The task has

remalned for the communlsts of the Soviet Unlon to.combine
e

•

'

•

_

'

.

~

'

•

•

,

'

thls s.nseqf ld..,10gica1 universality and,superlority
w1th a
.
:

',~

'

drive.to .erase
the",", lnferiorlty.
)
<
. "

t'.

'

Tbe ...ns chosen to accomplish
"

"

thi.task
a xo:el«tionshlp wlth the Wele that was
. , .was
" to create
..'
.

,

na~owlnl

equal andhonorabl" chrouah a

.

"

.,'

,

of the tecMo1oatca1,

and c\Jltural
gap. Th. problems with Chlna have, at
.

econom~c
"'.

';

the salM tl.8, d,e'Jtroyed an)" pretense of un1versallty.

Soviet

eont1:01 of S.ltet;n.Europe alIa played a vital role al a trans.\',

(

.

.

'.

.

• 18'lQD.~elt for idea. 8Qdvalu... between the ,reat politieal
pqwers •..30 ,
Accord1na to
.'

"

S~lzb.r8.r.
J

the Sovie,t .1.tuat19O aa
c.... to.~er •.. ' !Ie noted

_.

•

I"

ear~y
~hat.

d. Glu11a besan Co reappraise
aa

~9~6, tw~

ye.r,. before he

the Weat had 8cceptecl ,~h•....

,1t.&;101) In.Europe althouah there.,.ti11 exl.tedv1018Dt
.

. . . , ' J

. . ,

re.iatQCe lnPthe'r paJ:'ts ()f the WOl'ld (such .s the Middle
East).

At this .ame time, the

p~olr•• "otd••Stal1nl&atlon

th.t ht,.. ~ ••n .launch.4Ju.rted • ,olltJeat ~ha..
"

revolts ,.b~Qlt. out

Wben the

,-'

10

Poland and lnR\Utaary, t;hes. po.1tt"
pol1ticlt,lgas·could bot' ha"e b••n1imc:leaf'to.the Soriet
l.ader'~lp.Ceftabl'

'they must. have ftlal1led that Ia.tern
Europe·could flot be conquered, that although Soviet influence

'"

30Zblgntew Brzezlft.kl. "'!tu.sla anti Europe." OElilA

A~fal~8t \101."42 (~~~'ll,

i964). p. 443.
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eould be felt through military means. the people had not inter-

nalizedehe goala of the Soviet

le.der8hi~

~t.

'*itb thie

the leglt .....yof the

Generat Hsard.. the
dynami'..

~e.nnti.t

and had nGt aceepted
riall~.·tiOftt

the

• .-ent to hlt..,. loat ita

The ,;ala ... tft £\trope had 'been tacitty aeeepted

by both alde, . h a . a. the" tlftlted State. ~1d not nali.-

tieally hope to "YOll-baek" eeilMtntn, •• to',the Sovl•• a
abando. . . . .,. hope of oOMbg 10 ,otM.. ' 1ft GerM",. Itat, or

'ranee.) ·the

._lasly.wgn.

nail_118m within the bloe

which at thit IlM :". . . . .ll••ttn' It••ll .ub'tantta'" the

C8ftft.t'.hl..toneal

OOMeptlOft.'th.ft.tlo~st.te

ad

the..f ..... , a.d"-sreat.~".t.shtte the' •••1•••1ea which

•• a_lieu' made. ' we Iftl, ...aNed the sori.. leader. ••
,.ll.tto..................... lft.ftbanelnr·~hetr own power
. . . .....uS eM . _• •fnatl.... l .4tftne....t. 31 .
. .blat .• lwaelt{tNUItd . f thiltegle aM tj1d.a*" lfteo '

c_Wwad.ofttM CJe..-.1". view of

1Pr~.

it 1s Mt' dtlft.eult

to . . . . .can4 ............ ".It •• tbe lo11owlftg whieh de Oa\111•

• d.

~_,.....

1It 1M

~lfth'R.bltet.

ht.'OI7t

4feft ,aft Of. tfte ......leftat teri8tOft. if! .....
that on the Soviet aide of the world a few 1Ddleatloft8

.f

Yel~':~t-::a::!!:-,m:~er; :JP:::~

has been aald
by." b pOalelou ofr•• poM1bl11t,wbo.. -vt..aa .'
called "a t,ruee on In,vective. are proelalmi~ the, '
d••~CO .... 'pMe.~bec!. . a't.*.otl~.l reality .. au.
I •. ·. .erlnglo the fact that 11'1 certain troubled
. . . . . .th. Mlddle Ba8e. lnd\.a. Laos, Af'ric.. Central ,
At'DUtea. for ....,l....fOaeW at '''11 tltme 1. "training
F

•

<

J"t

I

1.«

•

31t:.L. sulabeqer, "I'Oft"!!' Aftaln I RGV de Gaulle Saes

Russia," 11K xatk ILmtI (June 24, 1966), p. 32.
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f~ pou~1D1 oll Oft the fir.; I .. r.f~ln8 to the lact,
that, alter having appeared to call on the three great
W
•• tern powers &0. put •• end Co .h.'. pre.enoe 18 larlln.
the Sovlet Government relaxed lta pressurel I am rea
fen1.nl h the f.ol ahaton "lbe 'ocea,len of .h., ' .....n.
debate6 in the United Natlons, the Ruastan repre, . .,&tl"., a.. co·.e..... tn ..c _ tantill •• tete'_
the cone piracy of 111'w111 and demagogy that a group of
Sta...... _
... le•• ,ttfted op••••klftl Co cws.nt... ,
against France; flnally, I am referrlnS to the faet that,
. . . . . . . . . . "aad W. .
ooatao.s an belllR ....
between leaders, scientists, artlscs, etc., whil_
awet.ctaa·· ehe,:tlM f t . lIhe ,..pl.. Ift_.lve.' MJ'perhaps someday exchange wlthout.hlndraneetheir goods.

t._

. .
" ".
Wea. . . . ela.l. tl"...'ara.-Z
De Caulle.a ......ed 'the poaltlonof tlte S09t•• Uaion
t.. Yin.•f tit.
acI'th. fuce... Cl'aduall, . Ihe lofts.
ell.....

,..t

1. . . . . ,...11 .... -to ....... 'hall' ..... blt",,,,,.',bt bell.... ,

•• "ina
.f aay

ba. . . .· . . . . . . 1. . wi.Ilehe w..t.

UDt~.t'.t

"'et.,••lb!11ty

-.bttt... &ad at,o the pollet••l, eeeaemic,

&ad cultural .1..... 8 .11 d1o .... this ~ac,... '3

An 1ft-

c....lagaumber of st•••• in th. . .rld toda, ••• parsoiaa an
....., .......t f ...tp pellcy.' 1'hl. . . . .need to .h. . . . .sence
of
•

~

11ft

. . . . t . . . . . lac. ehe eacI 'of the ear .ttO he". develotted

,.lttl••l phll••..."...... of· . . . .lllnmeac'

lM.,.......

.....ditlon,

Ih. . .rt.ous a.t.l1t••• o"tbe ..,.."..nha.. ". . . ,to_...1z8

1Ome._H-

of

ita that. pelte,..foI'mU1atlng proe ••

. a ' '

~'Qr

1

r

d·

l!

tt

'2.e GQlte, "S..olld Pr••• C01If.hIIC.," ........ 10. 1959.

Addrtt ••• ,

p.

'7,

3!staniey "'"Offma~1 "De (',aull.,

Euror.'

and the Atlantlc

Al11aDce." IPC""'. .Ir QralDiMC'gp. ,Yo. 18 (Wlntel'. 1964).
p. IS
34
.,
..'
eou.e de Murvl1le."French Polley Today," p. 616.
>

•

.
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This dual coneentrat:lon of power which had been so
to the _jor poiII.r. bad fal1ec1' .fe_ the . . . to

acc~tq

provide . 7 ....1 .ecurlt:7 01' _
,

,.

. . . . . to ...

other ..d.... of

.

'.

By the. 1"0',,, however. this tight allunc. sy.tem vas coming

-n..•. ~. WU'•.' 1__.1.D&1 ...t only throuah Ch.
natual
1Ihlch tt. bril1l" Ducal.., a. a 1'''.1.• .,.
inept JMtlkl. . . . ..t.th-.t.. Soviet .... theA.t:le. . 1.......·
were able to, take ~q~ of, th4 'nita lath- .tIl... w..
slnee _h w-.l ~JlUd nth aPPu-t1)t ~lWlbk.'_biems
themsel~.F_ the Sovl.et., tbe:""bl_ ... ;c~.t~.,the
to an en4t

-c..1oJaa

,

,

:

f"

"

~, '\

"

.'

r

Unlted.St.t~, '~tNUD ....

was the·.try Col'ldltlon

' , ,

._"' ;.-

.,.,

the' U8._

,'~'

'; . . _ ~i

i'

l-

!-fol'8O¥et". b.....l..-ity

of flexlbility for the le.ser power.

since tb6yweh'.t,l~ eo"manipuillte

io wldely 'wide',:/ th; '1'1'0:."

re8~tt ~t the~e
th~" ee~nOmtc' rehaibl1tatL,n

teet1veumbrel1i"rit ttt'elr guardian.'5
pc)tttleal tnlluinces as well as

The

of !!urop6" haa been' the rediseovery of their bdependent' per-

sonalitie. b).-:many '~f'thenatlons

of

Europe;

P'ran~e. since

,'be'ls nOt MbtOlled in any .erloua'· crisls' or her .~. was 1ft

an enviable pa.ltton to eKpt~lt thl•• ituaelon.~6

.eom.-ntart..

1n' the Soviet Pre.. during this same period

ot re4t.cOver, revuled that the Soviet Unlon was undergoing
a polley 4Daty.is at.tiArto that of' the W•• t. one 8ueh
t

F

I

...

II

35.1"~11."~"tHnehR"otr.ttOb

ot1l1.cOri. '~,p; '642.

3S~ d~ Mu~vltle, "The Role of France."

p.

256.51.

d
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statement vat the followt.rlgt
The

of international relatioDs has
.'at.. aquarell up agaln.t .
the need to aet up auch a system of eol actlve security
d~lopment

_broughe the !uropeaa

. lit

~ •.

Witbin whOle fram..,rk 1t! veuldbe "pGeelble

to find solutions fo.... the problems not only divtdlng
the '8Mi.1 tlf.aftd cattle_Ii.t ltate. but 41eo ",MCb.
tenslona 1ft relationa b_eween the Western Powers
tb....1....
.
Theae ~oblems cannot be solved by the imperi.tl.1: (oft_ eal1ed·'C...dlllordll f) poltC7 based on all
artlflqal op~.ltlon of one I~OUP of Eurqpean atates

t.0 lblOebft. ,the fomlnl' of t She ml.lltat'Y and pol1etc!41
S!OUplngs,. ~awa1 arms rae,.,le$allzeC! domlnation
of th. Itl'Oft8ea. p.,.,... aM netftetion and l.nfrlngement
of the .ovuelgnqtof the ~urol:*U" statel.
..
Ie '1.'" thee....,.. tnt..... ot all ~e ItftO~
.~.t.. ~olf.lp

10

..t~.fM '_l~.t peflC!e.ndseeud..,..
·01 mseteu _.~lft ~pe •

-fl. .... ,':

pr~·,th• •~4

• pewit_lt; .t:hirtrrait.f. 1ft ~'Pont' ~
~
~,
<IeftIbl'~••ee"" j to. ~·theGeftut.rj ~1_
eo'.' , • •ful settlertWJntJ ,.d 'l!o impYOVlrJ ' .t.p~ b1 ~ep.
th•. ,"l.tet~a.. " • • EUO.paan'.tate. be1.Oft&tns to" ,
oppow*' a.tad stat. . . .)1;, .,...
. ,
,'
,.
!he poee__ *halt. . . '4ittichthe AlDeneafts and the Sovleta

posed

ce one' eltOthft .1Id 'to

ehe

re.t of' the ..,rtd fo1md ita

baate la eft. _l.ftftce ttl ;~trfMctl ..r *l,M.' .8e. .t:b dl•
• •te lact d.'On11. perewhed • tVo-fold ftal1t,.;0tt .tHe

one

hand, ftet.ther

of ebe.. """'tear..'-

eould 1M" . .terrawt....."

on the ,other, ttwe,'11 ~ ,l""'P'.tft.' ·f!O t~k

ttUtt ','art7' ,

ratlcmal letelSft l'Olky Would ..er"'ttoOllsider the depl~t
of nuct_ weaptm •• ,'to'do 'sO: """let 'e*f'tablty rebtt tritM

de.tructlon of both.'"

ttfeb tl\e !O'V'tettfntOll .-In the ,at.ttlte. "trad
»

t.»

f

ttl

37'1. lfo"'••l ...., .""p._S_.rl~

.. Werl.1965).p.
'_e,- 6.

IDSUUI&IIIII.".1.., (Moaeowr., Vol. 11 (,ebmaQ',

38 Kel l y • "Freneh Restoratlon of Hlstory." p_ 643.
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evolved tn the year. following the war with the riaturaloutcome

~ln.a

an advan.e...,t tn human d•• ires 8ftd wants.

and 800141 conditions ln the.e nation8
facto1:'Y.

W~.

8conomlc

still una.tls-

nevertheless. with the tmp1:O\"EIment8 that \t'8r8 made,

deslres ...1'.... ed.Thus popular preS8U1:8 we 81so • potent
force ln

reducl.

che virulence of Soviet pol1cy.39

But baslc

to the ..eevaluati_ of eOllllt1ftl_ wh1ch d. (",a"ll. matte .... s the
dlspute becween the Soviet Ubion and Chlna:
"

'

rla,allYl coacenll... lts r.latto.... with the eut-

aWe, evwyth III 8elll appMX1I for Wd.l.a to '"' 401Dln....
• ted b, 1M dtlpute riththina.'Wl\atevel" happeftl in
, . . c . .t.aa,_tha, the DAtlenal !'lv.trle'.'he- ~.r
""Cgl. . .lthlD tbe eo.muatst . .rld the tft.vitftbte
lnoomp.tl~llitl •• b.tween • relatlve t y well provided
natlon l1ke the Soviet nation and the countless prole.a.. l .........f Chtna. ac. . .tna •• 'Hmaln tot.' a long tlme and wlll eonsequ8~tlY ma.ke any true (ooperae",. blghl, probl_tloal. Q ' "
,"
.

A'''l'l" •• "1960. de, ·aaulle had .at out co do all h.

ow14 .. '',,.In,

."Ca readjuat_t .f the.Mb.....

,laa .... ·Ns ..

08

a.

f t....led, . .

. Rltt

hi. co_ept of. b"tfty .anc1 .....1d ,.1itle.

_c.alye-.s..t.pt 18to h1s futUHdl"l....ey:

na. d1'¥1• • of ·the ,..,.1_ that- traM.lt,...,.
and North America 18 the main fact and the worst evil
of, OUI'tt.ae.:lVo _.,. a••••t "P f.c. to fae_, under
conditlons sueh that it depends sot ely on Moscow or
. W••b ....to. Whether 0". IIOt a lars& pa'l'C ot hulianit, 1s
wiped out In a few hour••
1ft thefa.e.f hob a .,tuaelon, hac. d.... '··
that there 11 no ten1torlal disagreement ,O".ldeolog1eal dl8'pute th4U huany Iaportan". In c01llNl~llOft with
the neeesslty of exorcis1~thls monstrous pertl. In
rl'aac.·.
chi••ttuation impltes three conditions.

vi_,

t

J, .•

1L $

It

rtf] etkgp'

,40

Couve de MUrvl1le. ··French Pollcy <r.oda".' p. 615.

..J
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The lUlt 1. a detente, 1n oth,r.words. the bettering of international rel.tlon., putting • stop to
provocat.·lve aetloM and.peech•• aDd inereaslng trade,
cultural exchange. and che viltta of tourtst. In ord..
,abata 1101:8 ,peacef~l atmosphere m.t.aJtt .be created,
falling thl., the (lUts111e•• of d•• parat'lon would
.ffllet dl,courqedmem. t.o .uc;h an .ten~ that one
day and all of a sudden. tor ally re••on at all, the
WOI"ld would flnd1t ••lf at war ••• I.t
tw,.ce In my
liletlme. beeause tha Afthduke
dud o-rbeeaus. '

W.'.

"a.

o;:.w:::rndD:::lftlOft'
l
S
'a apeetttc' degree of
colltrolled
•. preferably, abled at the
.OM

.t

4s.a~t

devlces capable ot carrying bOmb'" .t't"a,eeglc dle,tanee. t
I.. ord... that. the poe:. lltt.l I.t1-..,.d ,
~he .... tlme,
the temptatlon--.uddenly to pr~ke general deeeraet10n

....b.. yuuh.·

'.,

'.

,.., ,

,'_ , ., . _

n,e tbird conditlon 1. a ",egtnnl'ftg of orgaftl...
coop.all_ betwe... Salt ··'and We.n: devoted to the .ervice ot man, • e1ther by helping in the progress of
ua4erdnelop••. ~pJ..IO!' by c.C)llaborat~OI, t.n.the
g~•• t projec'ts of SCt.Gntille r ••eareb, em whleh dttpeJkts
the l\l~u1r• •, all. 4~ ' . ,
.
11 11ltla lfany dll.gre..-nt amona the

~.

W
•• tara alilance r8,ardlaa

• f the

'-""''''g
q... C'~ b

C01'l'~C;C'

~be

mem~.r

•

d•• irabi11ty of

and Qoopel'atloo with tbe S~v1.t UnJ,on.

The

eMt_"'l., b.",.cm the }hd.ted Scates and Franee

regard' . the ,C ...lag CMt tbl. pl'OC •• ' of

.d~u.t.er&t

mu.t have.

The, Ualted Stat. . .ppear•. 4Ilulte r ..dy la the ••rly 1969"

CO ...... t.a dlleua,lou :wlth the $ovlet thllon that could

.,."lbl,. haft hed la.tlDJ
~e

I.-portanc~

to th",. natlon. of ,Europe.

Oa';l11. waa, of cour.e, opposed to any .uch inltlatlves

or di......... that couleS
b .an)' way lead ,to a lolldif1catlon
-.
.
'

of ttl. ,,"ltton of the

"jot'

pew..... ".

""'*' that.., such

deal' a_4 be poatpQll4Ildfol' a ,later tble when Europe would
I F

I. i

a

J.

III

;'

.. ,

I I

•

II

1

I

I"

.. o'French

414- Ga11....M~.-_rtlftt.aa'. -~.'l
,'"

: ..,..

"'1.<"

•

.1 I

-

ro...1.gft Pollcy Following the 'allure of the SUDlftlt Conference."
May 31. 1960,

~1g,

A9d"., •••

p. 75.
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be

aulficiently strong to be among the bargatners. 42
Oe Gaulle has no illusions about the pttrpOse and intent

of elthertheUnited

Stateao~

the SOviet Union.

He realized

long ago thateheireflorts lh the lnternatlonal arena were
_preillon. of thelr own nattonal lnterelts.

IU:her a t . .

porary accommodation between "thei. twonatioM or the con-

tinuatlon of tenatOnl were unacceptable alternative.. To
avoid this situatton, de CaultehopedtO create a balanee of
power whleh hecOftalde'ted 'to beeoruilttent Wlch the emerging

political real1tt•• ; .~'h a b*tanee 'ttOuld be one that 8a"
proper recognition to EutOpet.teohOmle and potitle.l development ••,; Aa
c i. 1 946~' "only' ,tx fnOftth.i.ftft re.igftlng

uri,

power,

de

Gautle'deelared that

be

would favor. re.tor.tlem

<21 atablilty ha'ed 'ioritfto'old! Wotld';" that '1ft spite '·"tageacld
t ....gumefat* a~d dtlagreementl, the 'nation. ;01' tul-ope wout~ ""e a
pOtent

fOrce'

In worldpOlltlel OM. agaln. 44

neGaul1e f a !'e.entd'le!'lt of ill. rot. played
United Seates has been reinforced

b1 'what

by

the

haa been regarded

aa Un.atlifaeto!'1 dlptom4lc,both'.tl:h re'pect to objeetlvel

al ..elf as to the mode of _eeutlon. ' Too often the united
. ('

•

44

State. has retained a rigidlty Which resulted in the 10.. of
lrretrl..abl• . " .....111.8 Jer Begollali.. with the s..tets;
.uch oee. .ion. wIlea Ult4tl'ltal ctlM1'du nadued tbe SoYlet

Union to,", dl"te.t1eally cfi.Mtlvantaaed

weft

the "'tll of

Sta1b.- .tbe 19$6 1IP'tt.aiag.1D lola_ aM H1aqa1'1"
ob•••• loe

"rioa-.

,,'ca. r ..ar....ia& ............ CD 11 .1. . . . . .

ldeololY bu ............ al .aa\lll..... lC. ,abe· UbllAd
State. t..death .f

~l.l'1aa

1(.,1•••;'.

•· ...luQl••.,.,. Fol1owlaathe

d.. Jo.............tn.t.oa ...I.lt.a*

t.a

aD eff.. . . __ ". t.e . .l,1 .fter the 1964 electlons, thls
again nlafoned ......h IJce,tt.Ot.s. 'abatt the altt.llt7 .I-Che
Ua1... 'St....' ....peele f . Ike ~.wa..

..s'..1N11......Chat

the

ftM1 ....l r .......f .eGaull.-.fta1ollofJwope . . . -lid
ad w.talf_eowial.1lt:. . .tl.oDa1_1111ca ... ·befOSDl t.n the

laablltAy of '1M UIl1... , . . . . . . ;Cake aub....tial.COfttMl

of

c_ ....

10.. _ , ••••1'. _pf.ttJ . . . l'l_ly .....l •
...... . . e"'ilIsthlb ,,........ ,.1101... 45
,.1lOWi.llc eM

.0........

w_.

,he 4q . , - -

4. Gaull. aIIIIOUIlCe4 lhalhe 1eotced
~

V01Il4· be tbeel....l; of la'er-

.......1 ...a.U1C)'.wb_,I-.ope wodd be able ••
.ti..ofif_

.ala1n,Mlpl'.I."

,...'MIl' any

O¥W all 0ItMn. 46'1hl. • . .

......e••s.. "b..... fwIcIa_cal

t ...... 10........ pelle,. of

eM

rUtha....lk'
e

r

in

iii

'. st.

Of

IT

It'

•

1

LtAd.:1:r.l~7~tJ:!:~;14~!~·2r:d Ch1na~ane." .lIa
.
ill

46S.h :by de 0.\11;1.' al Lill.,

Rft)"Nl\ld.. ··EADla

DlJ.lalat kblr'"

OIl

u

June 29.; 1947:1'.....
glUJ.l •• p. 14.

..

4.5

Now. 1n the last analy.ls and as always. It ls
oal, In eQulllbt'lam thai the world· trl11 find paMa.
On our old cont1nent t the organizatlon of a western
the "ey··l... t equi••l ..t to tll•••hiah
exists in the east} may one day, without risk to the
tad.,.u... t.ad tM freMom .f each .tloa and laking
1nto account the probable evolution of political
"St.mu. eac••ll.h • IRopan eatent. fhtl the Atlantic'·
to the Urals. Then Europe, no longer split in two by
~'Il...
ldeo1OS'.' tnatvoufd·beeoae oat-.f-date.
would again be the heart of civilization. The ace.sslon

gnu.,•••

an.

a.·

to prosne' of,tbe ••••• et',Allat lAl'nea aDdLalt.a
America would certalnly be hastened and facilitated •
. But al. ." the eoh.. loe of thi. areat
s_,
.

European community would lead VAst countries n other
eoeH........loh ate ___.... t_NI,..I' • •1"'0
t
,:~:~
r~t~er t~. to yield t~

,!!;.::lc: .io:!t;l<m,

. . Gaulle·- baa nott.'t the worlds.. tbe daft .....

..

..... '1>1• •1t......t.... , ......... .-t'.....- efttleal wlt""t

aa*.,tlas

te·be

_.~tt..

..,t

Ua td.a··cd.clAta.. : !h. . .

. . baI.. ._ aad ..td11_1_. . . . .e......... f ....... t. ef
Ga"tll.t ',..,Utteat'th--r,'ctt.ua to&: 1. . . .Ut'lWi811tg ·tAd

•• oa.tl.
wha.t:

ho,..

b',< reIIitalt4 world polittea!

-"ns..........lt:att.e

1'."•••

all._ II t. en

hal.....pt_.
Ger..,.

0..

. .tell . . :.... " . . ." . . 1.1'1 eM: C. . . .l 'a>

t'Mt'<c:eMl'81 -.,.": .... :.• 4Um ........

.....f'..... Mtw. . ' the

EaBC

alteDlatlve

is ....lief

_ld be"

&

By lneorporatlng

and the West.

the.e atat.,""te the eeOllOllleanct pol1tl.rld ay.t_ of both

.",.... ...hioe_.

ChaY would .........eedto

t:he , ...ceeeton of one nor

I.k

would e.ltber, of the

feel, Clomp.lled to; lead.·. . . . .lga aUJ)'POrt.
.• ' t

_.ant,. behlnd

1 •

.t

hpet'powaft

A . . . . . plan to
I

• In r

t

.'.
47deaaul1er .. H4ddr••• OUt.llDlna. tbeITlnclple.ofFrenr;h
FOreir..roI1ey'0 lowing the Failure ot theSu.nit Conlerence,"

May 3

t

1960, lfIs10l" 6s1diMau. II. 7 8 . '

.
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aehleve a ''ba.lanee'' was outlined by de Gaulte 1n an ofter made

to

Churehlll 1ft Movember of t944.

This ptan was

to eombine

tOft.a with Gre.t Irtta'in 10 that thele twO~e.t.rt\ European

natlens. '_,eeher with thelr then exlltlng empires, could
.... 'ltuCe.~ tMpr••• lve .e1aht tn world .ffalr_.But de Gaulle

,..t

equtltbrium
where1ft a revived BUrope would be a -third 'oree-; this was
a Yl.v of lurepeWh1eh lOOked f~om the Attantla to the Urals
and hal .1ftee Men'. per'tst81ltnoeloft of aau11t.t '.reign
,otley. 'l'h. exaet !tatur.of Chi. rWtved luropeha. never
offered

aMther alternatlve, that of an

be.....It. cl.....fti.1 1t 'has been th.jubjeet df much eoneen.
It l'd'ft,d.t.l~.b8_"able.

1\"",,1'.

attc1 diplomatl. !IIilWe. chat thil lurope

Aagl. .S . . . . . C

but he.

t"

vorl.

'~fto1lfd. a.ull.',

WOtlldnot metud. the

plaeeof'''-u•• itl ft. 'also somewhat unclear,

$'.1'0,.4" ...,••loawas "....,denled.

.1e.....'1"e ......ilabl_ "totM pOle".r

Ancl y.tanothet

a

diplomats t

W4Wlcl . . .ilf..b..l . , ....ed . . . Fr4fte~6vt. . all1attee.'

Thl'

1••••1••fti4tl...... co.-lAttmtly 'flagarded' by tbeOeneral a8

a nabnl and tlf'fkflClonaleefteOtrmltant to the 'POl1tiealOrI«mlaClOft" of the

eouatr1••• 43

t1frf)

dat..

'ftlt. 14.' of '(utOpftatlOft withehe Sovleta

••fpn._t.t.gly ..r1y
btfl~e

d.celr.altzln~

va. aware t.hat- a,I"'AREQSbnIDC wlth
1"tteIIIIoD~..
,

-1;",

"'.1', •• c..tte

the Soviet Ua10a a18ht

that ....... t.n t!d.• ' dlrfttton
, . .,

"

,

I;"

.

4..

•

,4

a

'that Aftglo"A.ertean

woUld M g.-at ira Europ* .fter'the

be nee ......,.

to

a,

4'*••1dla,"08 Gaull.'.

.Ii

'r"',

,

,

.. nru ••• fS' • •, $ , 1
,

'

Foreign Pollcy, U Pl'. 176-178.
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were being made by Franee early in 1941. prior to the entrance

ot the United State. into the war.

He evoked dee'P-rooted

leetings tor thi. idea by appealing to geo-politieal arguments.
He eonstdered the United States and Great Britain to be

primarily sea-powers, whereas France and the Soviet Union
were continental powers with s1mil.r goals and problems.

For

deeades French schools had depicted France a. a regular
hexagon with three marittme slde. (the Channel, Atlantic.
Mediteranean) and three land frontiers (the Pyrenees, Alps,
and Rhineland); this suggests, so they argued, symmetry and
a naturally balaneed perfection.

Thi. argument is national-

i.tic, traditional, and of very little importance In poliey.
making.

Nevertheless, this image has made its contribution

to the thought of General de Gaulle. 49
The

question that is presented, therefore, is of deter-

mining the direction toward which Soviet Russia must turn.
The emerging danger of China, the increasing power of West
Germany, and the continuing influence of the United States
1n Europe (especially 1n Germany and Great Britain) serve to
reinforce what de Gaulle regarded as a "natural" and "traditional" tendency.-that of cooperation between the Soviet
Union and Franee.
~~cr1dis

The only obstaele to this tendency which

could find in his 1960 study was the question of
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•
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Algeria.

Accordingly, today there is ample reason to specu-

late about this possible alteration in the world power
balance. SO

•

t

A

'OMacridis. "De Gaulle's Forelgn Policy," p. 179.
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DIPLOMACY OF GAULLISM
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~IIl

HlStoRlQ4L ,ASPll.Atl.OlfS NIB aiMllAL OIJECTIVES

Qf DE GAULLE'S PORKIGR POLICY
0.

Oau1t.'. political philosophy embrae..tbe totality

of the bt'enationat .e.me I 'he belieVe. that 'ranee ha.·

re.pon•.lbl11t .... vldch '".'eb ... oaly bey_,~ ........d.r.,
bat at....leyoa4au.-opeeo the ! ... uner••f

politte.1

_ct.... e8ftetf~t. the '~.

_he world.

..

.ecu.s.t:r 01 &he
loos.ectac ebe Idll&ai7
ad

futlrre..Wh_ ""'.. lIi ....e y....
Ita,,'s ,.; tbepoll.er--ken • •t ··haft. Men fJapr..... 'b,' the.
lnIiplfte:.... .,.11

othet'tdttutr

f~.1a '!We faoa of

sueh ~•••_.taht.··th.'eft.that rtaeeeoutd b. so
•••U.l,. p1Il........ if 1t t • • eet .'-.ftateri... ot ..... -'SOr

powen tU.etat....... to .hleve.' .... ctea..... of 6011tteat
ud military
~epGftd.ae..
.
.'

,

De

Gau.1.l. blht
,

re,..tectlY _,re•• ed

hopeI ol~l.ttfta Fraae'elntotbe' poaJ.tloa

_ere!_ aft t.1Ide,endGbt 'f)C!Jltey and 4et a8

.aA..... .........

when 'ahe c..14

Ii

cheek, after a

pewel"ef eeeh of the two t.l1~erftfttoftal glant ••

Thua. tM tttdepeadent polley lifte whlch de Gaulle 1. pursu1l'lg

ts .ugge.tlft

of

the

pa.e

vb_ trance, under

so

tout. XIV, served

51
al the guarantor of world stabtllty.1 Such an ladentlfleaClon
wlth t:be hUtOl1.eal 1"01e of Pnt1ee i.. clea..l,. ill_traeed by
the fol1 .......bC __ t

.......

tlh1ch tta\ll"tac baa ds.ne,..

att_loa,

.. I

I"

•
11(&1'01. "Po1Dcan aw•• l\a&lD.... ,p.,698.
I

7

I'

Pd'

ls,..h 'Y de Golla' al Bu••-ftrft.Ma..eh 20,1'64;
found J.a M&un.aet, .Qa
.',

&MIll' p. 211•
r

S2
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eOftCernfo~ the 8overe~n personality of each eoun~.3
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In 1\18

lnd~enee.

f(W
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.
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I
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t
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renew bla
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'

UnlQft to
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Amerie•. donilNltbhu
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haa
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mat.n t:8Uoft
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of

AmerleaJIbu.trt... lft.'Curopa,'cnd· .-n. bc~-1tla hcbMlo.,.
gap.

I1t tbe6tr1y

1950'1,

;luJropeaft lftdu.Stry appeared co

tl 1fOUltf
t. manty_yo•• haW..... '

be reeoverlng 'and tmmydtlelpated the day when
eate~ wl~

ct.eunited State..

thll bopeha.,iheen di8'pellad.
I UI

All lDtftGltlng bldleatft is

•
3C~ &a !lsM..l .. "1hellol. of Pr.nee. II
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4J ••n Daniel" ~eader of Europa and Arbiter Between
Bloes. ft IB I_Ill. l Vet. I'! ,reb'.tWlty 20, 1965). p. 11.
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the "teehnological balance of payment." (measured by the
flow of lnternatlonal payment. for patents, llcena •• , and
other lnat~nts lor the transfer ot technical knOwledge);
ln 1961, this flOw favored the United State. ttveto
.

.

Oft8.

1

Another source of concern to We. tern Europe 1. thenbraln
dra1n".-the .laratlon of aet.'ntlat. and englne.r. to the
Unlted Statea. Although the Unlted States cannot reali.tica11y
be accu.ed of deliberat.ly 8ngbaering tbi. fot'll of eo1.01l1allsm,
n.verthelea. de Gaulle atill hOlds the Uftlted'State' hegemony

to be the cause of thia .1lratlonl mOreover,". re.l1•••
that the poaltlon of tb. United Stat•• 1.....;.nforeecfby It. S

The etfect'that

thls G.~llt.t r"llaatlon wll1 ha•• aft tha'

Gener~l'. pollei.' can be perc;tv-d'bytaklftg. loOk into
"

.

~

\

hi. me.oirl, where he ap.akl' dlrecti~ to tbe Uftlted Stat...

coneeming French polleylndepeDdeneer
, :'
.In mortal danger we French have .untvad 'inee
. , ,~be81nnlng of the century, the Unlted State. does
not give ua the lmprea.lon that it regards lts own
_s,ClaY .a Ilnkec:l, wi.th.c t~ of. France, that lt vultes
Frane. eft btt 11!'••t'nd'ltt0nl, that it 1, dolftg alt
: le-ean, to help h.., .tol'emaln or become 80 ,~pce _&_In.
Perhaps, in faet, "e are notvorth th.' trouble •. tn
, .,tb~, .8!.t 10U" 4re,_Hsht. Bu~perbap._ Wfl shall,rls.
again. Then you wltl have been wroga. In etther ease,
your ""v101' tends to .a,11eute. U8.
"'
,.Al~.·hq couWared
the, indepandent
poslt19n whlch
.
.
,

;

,

"

"

de Caulle hu ••• UII8d to be the cotaaequene••

and taml11
,

backsround~

Certai~ly
I

.!oc.,

,

Fj

ot hlsed""eatlon

durlng hls schoollng he
,
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~4-
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W~I

exposed to the writings of Charles Maurras. who has been

referred to al the
:

de

Gau~le

;

European

godfath,er~f

_

.'

Yet

fascis~.

f,

..

found h,lmself afte:", the war owing hls political,

military, and personal fulfillment to the nation which
Maunas regarded as the

cont_in~ous e~8m)'

0'

France,

It was

through the help of the Brltish that France was able to
maintaln herself ln the 1940'9, in faot, even as late as
,"

,,,

,

1958, Parls newspapers were claim1ng. tbat de Gaulle's.b1d
for power was backed by the Brltisb tn order to e.tablish
.

.)',

their man in office.
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"
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•

.
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•

•

~aulle

de

,'
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,

-,

'..

of leadersh1p whlch to him seemed
•

•
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,
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~ co~,c1ence.to saY_DO~h1n.of
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"

I

"
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'.

noble.
' .

'".

pqwer of
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.

I ~,

•.

decla10n muat be found.within the leader him.elf and not
1mposed by some extemel ordeJ:'.
task to

;'p~rform

and. the freedom

'~

D,

.

~

"

.Gaull.cr1ed~t

to' ~~rlorm the' ta.k. 8

f

fot' a
The

task which he has discovered 1s to a •• ert the Independenee
I

I

'Ray Ai.n."Anat~ of Gaullism. n iii. LIM.E. Vol. 46
(March 4,1963),. It. 11. "
. ....
. . -, ' .
8da Caull_. i4aI.

at'~

SWArd. p. 43.

'5
of IT. .e .M to .ecaplue bel' ,over.lpty.

loa.erpolltlcall" l.,otent

~d,dapaad •••

Franca 18 DO

upoa the Unlted

State., the t.ak-for 4e G••lle, therefore, 1a to .ake the

..Tld .wan that t1tl.
eM.e bat ta... , ,lace.. Fl'aDCe
(aad
.
..
,

,

"

.

.

,

,

.

"

w•• t . . . ~pe)_....fus.. to c . .~1rN' to ba, &ruted a. thouah
it v~. . .clrel, d.,endeDS, upDft,A.-clcaa acoaomlc la¥ae,.
aDd pollt~~lp1oma'lc aCqul..cenc•• ~
V.ruat baa· expla1Ded wbat thi•. Oa,,111.t. decCldAatloa

to be. b4.pandaC1IINJI8

~

teqa; of tbe political,

t.l

-' D''''", • •1.e tra. ' ......
ca.ent ~·ll
lJaacaJ.l ..r D' alto"s, . . . 1'.".,.. dlt. 40._ • la..
harte. 1. 'eapaelte de falre entendre all volx prop"

.

deltnlr 1.,- objeetil. de a pOl t que ext.rieur.

.'0C'af'

et, ~e.

pl'e"'_ la. 4n1tJ,aC~"" >
-a I . . . . .....ts.
Hut precl.iment, .ffermi!' daftl tou. Ie. dOmain••

"va

lu •• ,1'&anpe_.OGcd. . . . .1.t·_t.~ q•.• ell.-l
pullse a'aftirmer COllIDe un. rea ita, notl18eul.eftt

...o~u••
~1&w

_~ politt,,,,,.~

toeM.at ..aceat

veal. . ." ...uCed ...

~M.wada

.Uit.!.r_.

y...,.",

_ ! ' •. ""

an "lcleololY_ of_ ....

of - the f . .e,S,p ,011£;,......... .

The cSl,ft.ew.ty of plamd,. . .tl'at.., with_..... than two, pl.,.......

w..

-.tat

.sUfle..lc.

a H8Ull 'bee"..

a Cead.-c,. CO foq.

all facte 1aCo Che ••ru.s_t pldel.Qea of the .uteRt
blpo1a..

world. la .•UCA ." woJ:ld, of cOUS" ••

the

_l.t..ou

-.-ber. had too. .v.bordlnatt. ~o -ClMt d-.culou
pcwer:ftd .-bar. of . tbe a111aM.. Thu.I 1a . .

.1 t . l.....
01 the

,,_,e

• ffOl't to
. . '"

~
ad

t.he vor:ld .. • lIOn "_1.ccab.le.pl...-, In,
.

.

."

.

-,.

.,

Jta.:=lQ=~h~V;!f. a,am;l~;

Anglo-;~=!,!·
6ii:=1,.
1964). ,.. 39.

.

lOv..-.aac, "Foad.enU at Objeotlf•• "p. 46.5.

• II I

56
which to 11"., independent national effona have ben ltororagly
resiated. ll t;e Caull •• however. revoltedala1rtst cht- extel'llal

lnlerfet"ftftee in Preneh policy; moreover. he wa. ccmvlneed

that the context of international polities bad changed durtng
the pre"Wloua

.eea.e.

'ftle 'bal.ftCa of terror

~eed

by the

nuclear stalemate 'hal prodU4M in tbe 1Id.ftda of the I't'eneh a

eonstant

"'Ptcton

of the major .etora in world pOlitie•• 1!

The Amftlcan e. . .taton were in "b.taftttal

agretmieftt

tha.

ttt-.n••• whieh the United Itat.. IhGWed t.n tft.Cuban
ml•• lt. erial. abOuld haw ·beeft polttl... ,.nof to the.llies
the

that the cOIIRitMftt' of the United: Sta••• ·w••. g.nu1M.

IUt to

de Gaulte, this .leuatt.eta re-e.tabilibed ht, , ...... 'ear••
Aware

that

1ft: .~.

prevt.... yea... the ·Unitetf State. ..." .t.dItft

weakne.. In ...lbaS vt.th the S.neta on theCe1.'lD&n .\qiaeet loft ,

the c_eralooneluded that fl~' w.seYi.eneed lit Ibl,

ca8. CJ1l17 beea._ it inwt...... a· cJl~eett""eatto ttl.· Dnlted

Stat... Thus the firMne.s ower .ueh dlreetthreat. onl1
contined the doubt. t.n the"rtmeh .inds regaWinl What help
theymlght raeal... 1f thelr lnterdt • •ere thr••eened. 13

'It t. .1pltlcaftt t Nlwf.t'ft1:. that de 6aul1e haa
denledh1.m••lf the polltteal barsatalltg

poWer

11•••'1'

ttutc he hal by

beblg loo••l, •••oeiated nth· the Ublted State.'ln the Attantic
Al1taftee.

Am8Ii.can po. . has been eODftftiently e.ployed to
t r

llKe tly, -tl'rench ttMtoratlcm of 'ttl. tory , • pp. 646-47.

l!Crabb. "Oauillet Revolt," p. 40.
l3GrossGr, nForelgn Policy of the Fifth Republlc," p. 203.
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.ene .a a wamlDa to the So.t.eta that &111 _Jor att-.,t to
d1slUPt the present power l'e1atlouhlpe ......tel r_lt ln a

major confrontatLon with the United Statea.

At the 8am. time,

4"8,.••

evert polltleal tatle at her
1., to pQl"8ue
an ambltioua polt.c, withcNt tmtrwheW.,. _lltary might. 14
l1ftder
cir_Caneu , ..aneta has .,... • .,1. _• •_ _.c
France uees

,1\".
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.
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-, '.'
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•

'-:~.; .
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and e •• b. h.olft.,tb_h

beloaa.

t ..

" <"

.,

"r, ,~

~'e.he't."

'l1....... t., ......lt.~S

0.0.11... lluei. wt••"'. 1"_*"7 of

'.ac...

his det~tloa:,.,t to allow 1M 'alat. . . . . . '...t1., of
"ranee

bet CGfttbgarit upon the deelalon8 made in capital. other

than Pari. 11 .emethlng 01 an echo" II"Om the mouths of the
,

,

.

~

neutrali.t leaden.' It i. eharaetWtatle. it . . . . . 01 natlons

.

that aft att_ptlng to build their 'powertobe very adamant

in thelr"" ref.41 tob_oates' satelllte of 'any major power.

Pranee, llkewl.e, although being 11 .-bee' of the We. ten
Allianee, Is quite Ul'IOIil11ng to allow her po8t.ti~· co be
JI1t

b

db

I

,

I

~!ti.·Burope to the Vratl," P. 13.
l'enbb t "Gaullt..t Revolt," pp. 40-41.
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1

, •

S8

defined automatically.

A nation cannot be indlcted beeau••

Own \,eeds

it strive. :'to' satls!,. its

and respdnd

to

itl l'lactonal

imperatives .16"

In a significant explanation of his pOlitics. d. GaUlle
explained what French independence would mean:
Franee, beeau.e she can do so... because' everyehtag lJW1te.
her to do .•0. 1t-.caule ,beu Fl"ane!.. ahould c~,
amidst the tIOrl,d a wortd pOl.1CY. Tht'Oughout the year
whuta u belAmd.nat we wUl .thua tfftk ttJlta¥"d eM .eMae
major taakl 11'lCumbent upol'l u.. The unl<m of Kurope •••
ctt. PI'OP'U.of cl""lo,~ ,QOUDtl"l•••••4contrllNtlon
to the maintenance of thapaaee.
'. .. Aa I~ ' " , ~.tobj"tl"t .. 'here al'8 concll.~OIl'
impo.ed upon us. Firstly, we aniat ,·pur.u. the .,toft
whloh 1"'1.11 eq~~ U8 "L~ • ~Z'1IIOft\lel..r 81'8. .1.
the only one with a power inadequate to the threat of
........iDa . . . . .~. .'17 .~ _1,. .•• wbtAb".tlowa
us 1ndependence •••we wIt, wlthout glvlftalnto the
l1.tuat.oM .i.ft wblob the ..at lull ~",.l"St·, but without
loeing the hope that human 11tierty an.·'d dtgt\ ty wt.l1 in
"tu .........1.1 ~...
,teavlaa.e theclQ
when ••• the Communi.t total tarlanreglme. Which stlll
.....-d.1aooutl:~llllal eo,afJ.ned ,.ple•• violl
Iradually come to 4ft evolution eompatlble wlth our own
. tl'. . f~loD. 'Ih", thue, . . .1t1 be qpeD to Surope a.
a whole prospect' 1ft keeping with tts resourc.. and
. lCI, ••pacitie..
.
." '.
"
,
.

t ....

.

~

...'en ob.e""8,,, . DOte

,. f ..... hi•.. ova

p.ad....

o~

polt.c~e••

.,~Ilat

,de Gaull_ 11 attempt1ng

att. .ClDa to ....rt tbet, tDd...

SilDiflcant example, of the , ..reb

his Dation.

for lrt1el*'dece are. 'he. 'reach att8lfpt' 10 clevelop...

J'IW,

partnership with We.t Germany, the publlc recoanltlon of a
,

"

" . . , . . . ',

dlv1de4

~Y.

d.t.n....t1Oa. to.
b I

" <,

,

:1.

v

ella l"eflop.1tiol,l of

•.

.•

c~t..t

~.

•

China, the

'.a. ,1'..... ova. .-:1881' ar.enal. and tlle
•

161W., pp.-' 39iii4o.·

17d• C.ulle, "N'ew t.ar', M••••ge ... Dec_bel' 31. 1963.
p.

244.
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reeent initlativea toward a Franco-Soviet accord. 18
B•• 'he tnalateace .f aha

r~e..hqpoe

1Dd.pend.... ia

not a ".la1 of 'hell' e . . . . . . . .4lC_lCyI 1f 1. _&Di. any

way be '"tfl". 1...........,. a 1...1a& for peace aad aeeurlty.
They

dealre to .seape the need to choo.e the one to whom

they must turn for aeeurlty. not the ••na. of securlty it.elf. 19
Thll ha. frequently been tai.understood. not only by po1'J111ar

opinion but al.o among tho•• who should be better

info~d.

Acheson reeently criticised Gaullist polley for rejecting
the .eeurlty which the United .Stat•• elaims that it pro.1des;
he regarded' the poliei.. of the French to be sueh that the

world WOUld be projected intoln."tt~bl. t.neiner~t'on.20
A more pereeptl.. . analy.is, howe. . ~ would reveal that the
'rencha" lnter.'tedin any efl~rt.' 'that ~uld allow them'
,-,

.,'

aome . .sure of .eeuritY, positioned a. they are so wlnerably

in tbe't:enter
Any wi. . . . . .l

.f . . . . . . .

of a world that I.. anything but at peace.
,

,

'

,

.~

.

10. . . ··auel_r veapoaa

cannot 'be ................ '..-ehef.vonbb"

11 1t ........

to 1..... _. . t . . . . . . ., thtft 1t . . . the WOI'ld .ha. . . .,,:.
':21
more . . . . . . .

......1' ..,1948.... oaull.,;I"......l .. hle poa,..,....euch
.,

,

I

'r

1

f'"

an.;

it

.

,

•

1t

18cc-.... "Gau11u& a.vola,," pp. 41-42.
19."';";Webft.· "AaAmtiowa .PW1d.. Freneh Pol1cy, 1959,'
QlnIDClla..",~, Vol. 36 (May, 1959), p. 274.

2~"""'. lOBi. fa""¥' at :Ct,.".,
21webft.'''PhMb POlley." p., 276~

aa v.II'l ••

p. 1S.
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for French securlty and

lnde~hdence a

I belleve that .e must defend Iurope ln Europe,
and t bell...... that by 1fi.... of 1_"".·, .hi8tOT)",
and.allo p~ycholQIY. Europe cannot be defended in

toftdon ••• Thla t. 'S qu•• eton wevl11 have to cake up
agatn, fo~~. th~ preparation of _possible wa~. franee
_It be ttfe 'eenip' of the fJt"r8ftgth aftd serategy of'
W.star.n Europe.
.
'1'0 clarify anY,doubte.and .U8W81: his maay crltic •• , de Gaulle

elaylfled hi' notion of the relattonehlp between Fraace and
.the United
Stat_1n •
.
,.'

"

p~"8.

cOllf.renee 1n 1963.
;,

that there wou14be no quutlou thet
ujorc4tftlllc::t.
"

Stat..

But

rD'~c.

th~

<

,

1. not th• • ltU&t;l~... now

~h.f.ct

•

"

event qf

I..

W,OUld be on tbe",',1d.
of &he United
.

pol1cy-makers .There should be
aurprl1u.a in

~ t~

ae explalned

.ftOth~

c01lf~t~

the

dl.tr... t.~1 01' even.

that., .natlona ft\1ahttalke ... "lfferent

"

,

•

•

•

"Ppl"oa.ch t() tIl. c",tlnl~t qUJ.ti~" .a1!'t.'ba 1n lntematlonal
attalr... 23, De (!aulle Was even ~.expr... lve 1n an earller

.tac.-.._t:
'. . .
Yet, until ve achieve an organtzed peace. if
''that 18 at all PO' •. lh.!f!\PftDC. e..b'tenc:l8 •. a.8 far .as she
1. concerne4. to be r~ t~d.fend. har.elf.TI\l.•

.-an..
ltr.'"
pan ot
Act.'1c .
of all.

'1\

~t

._hal11'emU.n
Ultepal
Al11ane ••••,01tt .111JnCe .appear•.
III Q1tde""tOl", lttobee_.,.fm . . .
• o,N8ilc. must. ".. .
ova. tot. 1n .tt, ~.
OWl
p81:',. .tlty •.. tht. .~
..roI111. t#la
... t.b.
_qutn

the
a I1v", ,....tltt.

a,.msct-...

,,*

a~tt~lDe.

other.

"'·_.'t. ."ftr

~..,tm.·t~t .he

\lUI
... ~ . b,.801a m18tftt8.,s, O. f. her '"...~.ot~J ltl Ihol"C, «bat ber d. .Ct.ft1. alttaoun

qa. ••••
harten...lat_

with that of h.'.11'le.. lIl.t ~tn 1" lift oWn lUlads. 24
J

Iii;

I..
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This vas • vartati., of the th.. that da Gaulle ...
peated tlM aII4 .,.....

III

AI. 6aIr 1Il.sM bCKlb

de Gaulle

-aued

that clef. . . . ., be the _1tlaea ,1".1'014'1. . .f t.be

.c1Oft,

tid.. dety· ...... be delee.eeel to ...,. otber . •ca...-

atat:. DOC all...,.. .. "' -.tie COlIC. . . . . upcm anoth.'s d ....

el.10ft..

Jus, . . lle . . . . . . .

,1'....

Ie uti. he.. &Mutriel

and tecn.1eal.cel Icaow..t.t to ,dey.lop • .-buiBed U'I'IY. he

till••~c'to the ....t:J.on' of .-.laar
arument. Without .\leh Dili..", ad I'Ot_tl.a~.. • natd._ 1.
re1egat..l _ . 'st4lte of ~otal de~ upM .111.... What
. .
.
.
has

ROW

.PP..Led

adds to the
there

am

01''-'"

be

1'10

of

_""h .' ."..c1_ u·· t ... knawladae that

I\IU'DC_that . eM:

t .....t •.•f, aay, .lty .ill

alway. nrnalllcOJDp'Uentuche bte'.N8t8 of , ....... 1.'hua
without: .....1.." of her awn, Franee would always be at the

merey of beCh . . . . . &11,..25 .,..hapel ~ _at del""t""
Ga1l11. . . . tat..... "S&cdtn&&ht.s aearcb f.- IflOti1I:"«Y ... the

follow11ta.

_

••

PIli.

•

u•
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of d.,erri.! it from heing .0 ... , aceorelies to ,be
clrcumatance8, the .-an. of as.lsting 1n t~1 delenaa of
It••111... lMitldtaS"4h(J ltftows .......le •• , .
He tben •••••i .... hiftls.lf to the . . . , oot'e of Ca.1118' foreign

Poll" .a he ••t'.H.ghtaoualy

.ast •

glue.' OPOlf hi ••..,.·
at the .... t1tl4t cOft.Uen. ,Il. 'u_. .,

aad

'.,.t1a.l1':;chre...... ,

'1ft • • • 'oUr eouall'y,

fiads It.elf onee as&ln faced with the neee•• lty of
,.••••• lMS th_
pOWerful ....,..... of the 1ft tnt I e •••
of c~.t the others 08.S. to ~•• e'l t~em. However.
to tllisuide ·ut. tb.. vole.. of ''''''11
anti ....B.81'
are a. alway. 81~ltaneopaly ral.ed. 'Xt II ...le•• ,·
.ay .eme. l '1t
e ••
say ••
The••
,.1,.. r ...-. listened to. _ometl__ and to her td.s.
Mtebl,'" tr. ... of t"8 evo hr.. "".
h....,. art,,'l...,.,' they acla11led in concert 1ft 1914 •
... • 1:'IIOhi eOI't=4, nO "ahter .lnnfl,' the.... .
backwal'd ad brat.ftl.a •. I'WIUra er1ed II,l al.Oft befoYe
19'9. But Iht. It... ·•• ··.ha 1 IIOt all_ 'l'e\dt.n. aNt·

mO.'

t.,.
h.....

i",,, tl,.'

f.........

111\18 ton to Uwt.te ilw.alOft of our country. Moreover t
b' EM _dl' of Itt.· ICNbed and daogenus WOI'ld b
. whlc~ we 11"J70\S1' chlef dutr 18 to ••• trong and to

.M

oa.s.t....

'..

Oerhol. . .de a
....t ....t ••

_clear

~o~leclt.••

&uror-

..apoM

a........c of Amari.a' •

aftd 1t val Illa eOMlualo. Cbat th.

ef 1M Unit" Sta... cll' notco.ltlt"te ..

guar_'" ef luftfllJ'hlt leeul1.ty aitt 1enler4; R. "ased his
cone ius ion

evettt.

Oft (tee.1
,

: i.

~

~d on th. .tat..... and eplftlens
1

N ,

' , -

of eontempen", polltteal l ..de"· III the tJftl... S......

t_,..··

was little 4euht,
aeeM'tllag
to thl• •" .
,;:
i-

,

'i'Mre

.hat ."." t1alte4 .

State, would not risk total annihilatlon unless its interests
Ft • • •'

Ub

~

,t.,

Iii.,
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were directly ~lated.Z8 The Itrategy et -gradual rel,enae"
Whieh the

pol1e,...k~

ot the UnttedStat..

reeent ,ear. fall. to give the
de.1N.

~h

~rejeet.d

ift

the aeeurlt,y they

The Gatalll.t cone.pt of !\trope•• I.urit, lftV01".8

the baed...,.

DtletU1:

"pI'1Ia1 launche41 a.atna. aft _uYe•• or' s

homelbd (especla11,. ht. _jot" cltl.. ) tft suver '0 any major

otlen.iva 1n Europe.

Thus no NA'ro eommand and United State.

troops would be necessary.

Such a battle could be tought
and won by the rren~h forees alone. 29 !hi:! ~en.e of natlonal
responsibility is a natural eOfJcommltant to the revival of

France as a political and economic personality.

France has

refused to, allow her personality to be swallowed up in internationally organized struetures; the

~reneh

are demanding

the right to org~nizetheir own seeurlty.30
The coneepts of seeur1ty and independenea are clearly

joined to history and explained aa jo1nt politleal t.peratlves
by de Gaulle in a speech delivered before the officers of

the Ecole de Guerra in Pari. on November 3, 1959.

_at..,. rears.

The detense 'of Franee must be Freneh. That is a
wlU.ob hea a.t a1...,.. .... too . .11 . .4. . . . . .
in recent
I know this. It 1s absolutely elsen8lal I.bal • ~ reeopl... atee.... Wltll.
country l1ke Fraftee, if war should come. then that war

. . .t ... hw ....
I'

from

nIl'

I

II

Ita effort .... c 1M her .ff.11:.
-' JI db

,

11

'iii •

'¢

2S t er: ~G""l.t •• ~ .... Great r..r. N IftM.

~

.

(April. 1963. p..,.

29Geap

i

Stockholm; reprinted 1n 6S 1", Vol. S

:l4.

,.

"

"

.

'w. Henld . ~ "the."kiM to.

LusS.E. Vol. 49 (l-tarc:h

21,

1966), p. 6.

"

De Ga ....1l•• n l:Ia

.'

lac. . . . . . Mun111e, "~h Polley Today, fI pp. 625.26.

.

it vere

oebetwl...

ottr

country would be acting cGUfrtft

it baa be... s1.nceJ.t,' 0I'1g1n--to lta role.
to ita ••tl.r..pee~, to its veyY lout. Naturalty,
ahould abe occu1cm a.r1te, French aetense should be
to ."erythi.l\a

joined wlth that of other eount'ti.ec.That t.s ln~e
But:ltis lMJ..~_l.ble that our
datens. belongs t!o us, that' h-auee tta~end hewell by
betaelf. foche1:'.elf~andin her cpwtJ • •,. ••• the

Mt• • ,ofCh~..

aJalaD . , . . 1s te dalettd -eh.f..~egrtcy
ItQ" .a fJ:QII thU. neceaalt,_
Iapeelal1y tn FYance t all our yegtmes have been' based

govel"nman.e f .'

of the tenitOC'1I!

on eheit. abULt, to dOao. 31

lha fucurea8C;luric,. of Fl"AMeWa$ to be a deflQl.te principle
pol1.~1

... the Gaulliat fora1g11.

of th.e • 1xt l.a •

In whlltever .
..

"4Y thu aeQUl't.t)' coulcl best be ach1.eved,. tbeGen_al was
4et"=illad to d"~u. Slld ~h dlp1ouc1 to achl~et

'''orto
. • awiltrQf:;O \n kltiUUlY. he plotted a <:ou..... ' which
" .
. .

~11Ade

clW . ,

.,

' .

~

'"

fut:Uft.lt~t:1ve..

''La Frace VANe a ••=e~ .... del...e,alle

....

Heexpl.1nedl

ft.

veu& pas etr•

• ,.buae'.... e& ell. .. i.it al1lance avec le. &\1tC'ea P4Y. ,
.

,"

,-

1lbz'..."".. _ ,..
,

" , "

,

\

.~r.

*i••."..•. le couvert de
,

'

••• al1~
.. elle te~ la . .1na~ autr.. peuple•• HJ2
.
.',

, .

"

,

'

-

.""

coua1aa tq power LD 19.58,. de Gaulle 1la, be.
'hU obJeo t 1ve, of part~l,.tba 1n world affaire

S .....

t1;rt.va by
18 the

f~ont

.f Fl"an,..

rank and

as.~~i

r ••ponslbl11tyfor the security

these two goala of 1.Dde,pendenee and ,.curley,

'hu.fore, . ., be cOQaldered 1n thelilht of a thlrd goal.

that of .,galtey.

Resardl
... of what the foret..a_
.
.,

pol~e7
,

experts and military analysts might argue. de Gaulle believes

'lQUoted tn Maer1dl..

lmPl1G,b1, Al1x,

p. 133.

'2Speecll:· •• 11"1...,., S.Pt...... '19hICf_r.d la
fa,'eton, De Gaulle Parte. 1959.1962. P. 403.
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that Great Britain (and perhaos even 14ast Germany) occupies
a privileged position within the western camp.33

Thus the

strategic problems of defense which confront France have
been considerably enlarged in scope to include political
dimensions.

Nuclear weapons and independent responsibility

for the defense of France are necessities to the independence
which de Gaulle hopes to achieve in the diplomatic sphere.
Yet there is one substantial factor that must be used as a
frame of reference in approaching the notion of equality, and
it is in this respect that the objectives of the Fifth

~epublic

bear a marked similarity to those of the Fourth: this equality
is desired by France, for France--not for any of the other
members of the ~lestem Alliance. 34 Only io the moat recent
years has Europe been reborn as a political reality; wrope
is confronted with the strange problem, therefore. of
the direction that her policie. will pursue.

choosin~::

And it is in

this respect that de Gaulle envisions that the greatness of
France can be achieved.
herself.

He has forced Europe to think for

France was rebuked in her hi.d for a front-ro\.] seat

as a maker of policy for the entire western group.

He has

turned to Europe, then, 1n an attempt to assert himself as a
leader.

Immediately after he returned to power. de Gaulle

made it clear that France did not intend to be limited to the
33Grosser. ft'Foreign Policy of the Flfth:~epubllc. II
r>p. 204-5.
34Al r§d Gross.r.1 tI'I~nce a.nd Ger_ny in7tb~ Atlantic .
Community, h lDS'tn.t19uAl ~eltnill;t.gn. VOl. 1 (',ummer,1903),
P.

'67.

n
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role that currently was hers.

Although 1t was supposedly secret:.

de Gaulle addressed a memorandum 1n 19S8 to Henri Spaak. Prime
Hinister Macmillan, and President Eisenhower pointing out the
lnequalityof the political order a. it then existed.
Dc aaulle proposed the establishment, within the NATO framework, of a "directorate" to be composed of the United States,
Great Britain, and France.

This group, which he hoped to

establish, would concert poliey and serve as the decision
makers of the Western Alliance.
with the threat that

~rance

He concluded this memorandum

would reconsider its western com-

mitments if its bid for a position of status were rejected. 3S
Part of the original plan set down by de Gaulle would
be the extension of the influence of the Western Alliance

into areas other than the Atlantic region.

In this way

de Gaulle hoped to re-establish the position of France
throughout

t~e

world.

The refusal

by the United State.

to

allow Prance to participate in the formulation of global
pollei.. forced de Gaulle to look for a different way to
achie~e the equality he d•• lred. 36
It soon became perfectly at ..r that de Gaulle intended

to use Europe as rhe vehiele for 8chl11Vlft8 the role he desired.

na

took to himself the cause of iurope altd beeame the prophet

of self-reliance; and he pursued this role with a passion.
3~emoral'Mlvm of Septemher 24, 1958. fo\1DCl, In Mae:rldis,

"De Gaul!efs Poreign Poliey, II p. 182.
~Qrld

360 • War••I', "Pr•• ldeat de Gaulle"

Xad'l,

Vol. 18 (August, 1952), pp.

Foreign Policy,"

323-24~
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Yet hi. almo.t p.ychopathie aver.lon to any genulne unton of
the European natlon. made hl. real ambltions that much more
distinsui.hable. J7 If Europe eould be united, 80 de Gaulle
reasoned. then it would be .trong enough to resl•• both the
Soviet Uraion and' the unt.tedState.; 1IOYeover. it could lerve
4S

the mediator between these power-giants.

And if Prance

eould assert leadershin of this new foree, then the equality
which ls so dearly coveted eould be achieved.

The appeal

that de Gaulle made in hls bid to unite Europe behind his
leadership was two-fold:
the historical

~o.ition

he appealed to tradition and to
of Europe as the center of the world;

on the other hand, he promised not only security but also
independence once equality were aehleved. 38

Daniel suat\Arized

this aspect of Gaullism in the .following way:
Neither war nor peace, capitalism nor communi.m. confllctt.~ ldeolog'•• nor raeial dtfferenc •• are really
tmportant to him. He is quite willing to acknowledge
so.e truth of the moment which will flt·.om. t.aue of
the day, 80 long a8 Franca can share, on an equal
fOOting with the Great Powera, the leadership of the
world. And so long aa he~9de Gaulle, i8 one of the
people dotnS the leading.
In the very earliest month. after the war, 4e Caull.
had already begun to

ma~e

hi. appeal to rebuild the power of

France through the manipulation of the emotional pride of the
Europeanl:
n ,

I

37J.U. Hu.1z1~a. ItWh1ch ~Jay Eu.rope, II fgrjielP A,,,1rl.
Vol. 43 (April, 1965), p. 489.

3SFurnia., .l'sgg)l.ii Wlt. pp. 24.25.
39naniel, "Leader ot Europe." p. 10.

•
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i~at then, if not the old, can re-establish the
equilibrium between the two new ones? The old iurope
that for so many centuries was the guide of the
universe i. in a position to constitute the nee.s.ar"
element of compensation and comprehension at the heart
of a world tendlng to splie in two. The nations of the
ancient Hest, whlch have for their vital arteries the
North Sea, the Hedlterranean, the Rhine, geographically
situated between the two new masses, determined to
maintaift an independence that would b. dangel'OWlly
exposed in ease of a eonflagration ••• 40

The position of France today is readily observable.
~fuat

de Gaulle seeks of Europe is not a unified entity, but

rather a group of nation-states, acting 1n concert, under
the direction and leadership of France.

To achieve this

desired goal, an appeal has been made to feelings of supranational solidarity, £uropean pride, a natural desire for
power, and the prospect of future prosperity under such a
aystem. 41

De Gaulle realized that France could never discover

her post-war personality if there were need to continually
search to achieve security.

It would be senseless to expend

energy to attempt in vain to maintain a colonial empire.
ather the initiative would be discovered through a facility
of being present and acting, as an autonomous power, at the
most auspicious

t~e

1n the sphere where political activity

would be most cruclal •• that ls, ln the realm of the Cold War
struggle.
be

But de Gaulle also realized that France would not

powerful enough (from the demographic, economic, or

milltary points of view) to enter this arena as an equal
•

•

40speec h at Bar.le-I~, July 28, 1946; quoted in
Maurlac, • g,1I'll~P. 171.
41Hulzlnga, "Whlch Way Europe," p. 490.
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unless ahe would 8ucceed in assembllna around her 4 number
of the European nationa.
to

This was the way de Gaulle

~lanaed

ducover Europea this wu to become a basic goal of the

Fifth Frencb ~.publlc.42

Yet 1t must be noted that beeau.. of the C:0RI81ttaent to
le4de~.hlp

of the

~pean

group, the French have not lessened

their desire to occupy a policy-making position within the

Atlantic Alliance.

The door has never been closed by the

French to this possibility.

De Gaulle regards equality as

something of an equation of position with commitment, power,

and purpose.
is the'

Clearly, of all continental nations. Franee

II08t closely 1nvolved 1n Atlantic dlploraaoy.

Al'though

the other naUlona are closer to the actual conf1l'Olltat:1.ort line,
they are lind.ted in thelr p81l't1elpatlon 1ft Westem diplomacy,

becausa the,y either lack the commitment to any aspect of the
alliance other than the prevention of

~oviet

aggression, or

they lack the power (perhaps artificially as i8 the ease with
a divided Germany) to be an effective participant.

In the eyes

of de Gaulle, France alone possessel that combination of
national power. geographical position, and worldwide interests
which the others lack; this, together with the stability and
national unity imposed by de Gaulle, are the basis of the
French bid for equality.43
j

I

42Alt!.oro S£1nel11, UDe Gaulle's Plan," tilalltlJ;
,QI1ImI!i~I'MJ' II Vol. 1 (Fall. 1963), p. 3 ; reprinted
.1l'Om
If
Y. 1963.

43'umiss. "Grand Design,U pp. 168-69.
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Couve de

~~rville

pointed out the necessity of an in-

dependent European polley based on an equallty of positions
between the Lnited States and Europe:
••• if there is to be a dialogue, there must be two
pollcies . . . . deflned t.n Europe and· the other ill
Washington. The two polleies would not be hoatlle,
contradletor,y. or Lrreeeneilable by def1altlan. But
there would have to b!4 two. If not. the dialogue
would be a IIOIlOlogue.
But 1n order for Europe to play her preper rola lrl·

world .ffair•• de Qaull. ball.... that it 18
E;\II'O'pe

to be " __t.ted t Chls.

re-tmlflcatlofl of

O~.

~

Dee •••ary

fer

coone, pnsumea the "nor

V......,.t related the•• _.ieetivel.

1'.

L'wd.f1catlerl d. 1·1.11...... est at_l
d. . .Itjeetlfs essentiels de la politique ext.rleure de la
Frane. et "lame l'anlfieatloa .e l'Allema. . . .at
lmpos8ible sans 1•.reunlfieatlon de l' Europel eette
unlflcatloa de 1·....". Ht .uasl 1. 1Mlt d. • ,olttlque
franealse. En bref, i'Europe dolt etre reunit.ee
dans dee eondlt1Dat qui.aa~t aa atabillt. lat ....e
:if!1!.~e=~:t:.~15jouer
role propr. dana, 1es

son

Tht.8 ..pact of Oaul1ut foraip polley ... that ¥hleh
i.

the . . t olWlO\ll 111 recent ,...~.

Looking at the cU.plomatic

initiatives of the SOYlat Un1erl ad the Urd.tacl Stat•• during

the • txt 1.. , cle Ceulle noted a d.f1.nlte tendency developing
to diseuss their policies an.d understand the posltion of the
opponent.

HS,. "Yalta campl_1t OJlee qai.n drove him to reviw

the splrit of Europe 1D order to ••• E!I't his

0Wl\

aatlOftaI

pOSition and prevent the European situation from becoming a
~e p&WI:l

of the major power..

1._.0

tf •

••

=.

Thus greater stress was once
•••••

'I.

'.1 1

,

t

g

44Couve de Z'1urvil1e. UFreneh Pollcy Today, It p. 622.

45Vernant, uFondements at Objectives," Pl'. 465-66.

•
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again put on the eoneept of

8

Bul"Ope stretching

f~

the

Act.ntle to the Urals, new efforts were made to encourage
communieation with the Soviet Unlon. 46

But this eoftCept purposely was left in a rather ambiguous form; fot' rears de Gaultehad 'pole_ of sueh a Burope
without explainlng
achieved.

~o

it would Include or how it would be

In a preas eGnf'ftt!ftee 1n 1950 •. de Gaulle ••• fff'ted

his bellef that Prance eoutd take the int.t:tatlye tG unlce
':~uroi'e

"front the At1antle

to the t1l'a1.-

80

that evendtose

on the eastern .td. of the lWOh aurtaln would real1•• tts
conseq,uettees. 47 1ft 19.53 he otfered
explanalt.on b,.

_f>G

reminding his listener. that BUrope ".Ktende from Glbft1Uft'
to the

l~s.ls" ~ that

·anyone

wttoatnoe...ly ws.ah.. it eould

taka pare 1n a un,lced Eut-ope • ..48

dream of a

In 1954 he rep••u.. hie

Buro~ .xt~ln. f~ ~lbr.l'.Y 11

1'Oural, du

Spitz"',""g a 14 51011•• ,,·49 ...., it • • not' .,Iil hi. f11'8'
press confft'ence
•• PHtident of 1M 'lfth1lepu"liC! t'haW
.
"

de Gaulle unfolded the plans for the orientation of his
Bfz~z1nski

foreign polley.

noted

~hat

this proposal was

based on a common cultural and hi.storical heritage which
•

n.

t

•

I

t

F 4

•

46Taylor. "Long NATO Crisis.
,

'1.

T II n

"

n

p. 19.

,

47 Pres8 Conference, ~~rch 16. 19S0; quoted in Malsi?,
ia CitM1". AI. '~i'dlI"
p. 184•
.41rt0"lember 12 t 195 ~l quoted ift 'R&)"ftaud t rpreteD £011.,,:£
at 'bII~I'
wlylli. p. 4.
49Pr... Conferenee. April 7. 1954; quoted in }fassip,
.tl& GII~~I '" L'EMmRtt p. 184.
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de Gaulle hoped to define geographically; thus he would
capitalize on a lengthy historieal transformation and development if hi. theory were to be proven correct, this was the
gamble of Gaulllsm. 50
Wet who live between the Atlantic and Urals, we,
who are c;urope pos.... ins with Europe's daughter
America the pr t neipal sources and resources of civilization, weI who have the means to feed, clothe and
house ours~ ves and to keep warm; we, WhO have mines
and factories goina full bla.t, well-tilled 8011,
railways where run many trains, roads choked with cars,
ports filled with .hlpa. a~rt. full of aircraft,
wet all of whose children learn to read. who build many
ualver.ltl.. and labo.,atOl"l•• , who form anai•• of engineers and technicians! who can see, hear, read what is
of a natUl"e to aatllfy the mindl
who have electors.
hospitals, medicines to ease suffer ns, to care for the
Sick, to ensure the l1l. of ~taew.Dorn iafants--why
do we not erect, all together, the fraternal organization
which will lend ita hand to the others? Why do we not
pool a pereentage of our raw materials, our manufactured
aoadsl our food products, some of 0\ar'aolenti8ts, technolog sts, economists, some of our trucks, ships, aircraft in oreler to vanquish mi.ery t : develop ,the re,sources
and help In the work of the l ... -davelopedpeoples?
Let U8 do thi.--aot that they should be the pawms of
our pollcies" b~t toilaprove the chahC •• of 11f. arad
peace. How much IQOr8 worthwhile that would be than
the territortal .ElllSnanda. ideo ogieal claims. imperlalist
ambit10ns which are leadlng the world to Lts death?'1

wet

A

few months later he spoke

j~urope

~bout

the responsibility that

had for establl.h1na .... "ifttaln!ng peace-wtbe respon-

sibilityof a Europe united "depute l'Atlantique jusqu'a

1 'Ottt-al ... 52 The

"l'....c. objective of

this poliey of reunifi-

cation was made very clear by Font.llMa in 1960.
'Ott1!"f!ezlnski. ·'!Itue.la and Eurepe, fI 1'- 438.

SldeGaulle. "First Press Conference,lI March 25,1959,
t~jQ'
p. 45.
'
S2Speeeh at Stra.bourg. November 22. 19S9; quoted in
Hallsip. lU\ GllIl1 • .i.t. l'iyrpne, pt:). 184.85.

addll".'.
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Everythia& 18 aimed to accomplish our objective. however
remote, A lurope to lts lull geographic limits, with
Alrican. Near Eastern, and~-who knows-.Soutb American
extensions.,.A !urope that will DO lODger be divided
between American and Soviet zone. of LnfluencG, a
Europe which might e~ receive ~ua.ia the day it becomes ·~us.lan· .s it,ll predelt1Ded by hi.tory, •
Europe that w1llanee mora beeome the nerve center of
the world and Which mlght.if it were necessary arbitrate
between the two emptr••• 5~
De Gaulle a'l!u.'!ree" a s1mll.r viewpoint in speech.. during

April'· and MaYSS of the same year.

AaalD in 4ft interview on

October 2, 1961. de Gaulle ••pressed tbe readiness of France
to as.ume her posltion 18

~a

Europe balanced between the

Atlantic and the Urals."S6 This same theme was sounded ln
sueceeding years with a grGllt deal more frequency.'7
ttegard1ng the qU4stion of Get'llAn reurd.f1catlon in

part1cu1ar, the Gaull1at formula 1. as followa.
The reunlf1catlon of the two parts into a ai.ngle

Gcttmany Which would be entlrely free seems to us the
nQrmal destlpy ot the German people, provided they do
not reopen the q~estlon of tbeir present frontlera to
the we.t. the east. the north and the.outh, and that
they move toward integrating themselves one day 1n a
contractual oraanlzatlon of all Europe tor coope'C'atlon,
liberty and peace.

3§And~' FOh~.~:

r<aeridls, "De Caul1.'.
54de Gaulle,

1961,
p_

14

II.

"Adcil"888 _

taiar WrN'.t

~~hf 10: l%O~· ~t~'1 1n

ron~l1cy."
:

.,. 185.

..

'

the Future of France, .. Getober 2.

p. 152.

lS6~'= !t:olfi:~ =:::n~u=s=:tl!-salC! P..tl;ptraDSh

!ia. Lead... Vol. 46 (April 1, 1963), p. 19.
56Speach In ~a.h~t.n~ April 25,1960; quoted in
i1asslp,

Ra

g,1I~11U. l~iyrgJ)l. pp.

185-86.

57'01' acIdltlo~l .tacementlt refer to. ~.eynaud. ~il1.p,
at 'b.'lf~ ~ ¥Iull1, pp. 6-17; de Gaulle, ~ ___
, pp.9, 1 , Waner, "De Gaulle" Foreign Polley."

~
ih

•
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But, pending the time when this ideal can be
achieved. W8 believe that Ube two ••parated sectlona of
the German people should be able to multiply the ties
and relat1on8 betweenthemaelve8 1ft all practical
fields. Transport, communications. economic activity,
literature, eciene., tbe at'ts, 'be goings ad coud.AI.
of peop1e{ etc •• would be the subject of arrangements
which WOtt d brlna together the a.w.ana within aad for
the benefit of that which I call '~ermannessl and
which after all i8 COIIIOn to them, 1.a .p.ite of dlfferences in regimes and conditions.
As regards tur.niftgGermany into a neutralized
territory, this 'extrication' or 'disengagement' 1n
ttself has DO 1D84ftl.ng fot' U8 which 18 of any val_.
For if disarmament did not cover a zone whieh is as

near to the Ur.le.e 11 1. to the Atlantio, hew would
France be protected?

What then. ln ease of contliet.
~t~gg~e:::tU:~.;~:~8g:r!::-n:r:::t:al:~;,~.a, or
The Single word ... co-operation, was all that

~1auriae

needed to summarize the entire policy objectlves 01 r4ul11sm.
Each state had to collaborate with

all the others not only

lor defense but also for economic, cultural, and political
advancement.

A world divided between two opposing lorees

could not be the basis of such co-operation. 59

Couve

de Murv111e substantiated this opinion in a recent statement:

French policy 1s based pl"imarily on two funda_ntal pr1ftclpl... which ha. . alwa,. been hel"s throughout history: the principle of natlonal independence
8Ild the prineipl. of huatan .olidariCy. NaClonal 1ndep8llflece because COda)" t • • in the. ,..ac" ... doubt188s
for .. loaf; t1meto e..... the world 1.8 made up of nations
whteh can p_fully coexi.t 01117 1ft mutual ...., . ' .
Human 8011daritybee.... not one of the.e nations
can .lata eo ll.ft in 1801&t1-. bee.... to. _ny vLcal
1Jd:erest. are OOImaOl'lto all, _a\l8. over and «hove
today'. ~litl.l, the u1t ....te alm remain. th. _lverSil
advancement of mankind, the first condition for peaee. bO

58de Gaulle, UFi~sit ~e~s cont~~ene~. MIl~h'25. 1959.
Oddr.ulll. p. 43 •
HI

l'iA tor

.5~!aurtac.

IUl. GlvJ.J..I,

p. 177.

60Couve de }1'urville, '~ole of France, u p. 257"
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'11118 i8 the

mis,'qp

that de Gaulle envS.slott8 for Pranee.

H.e

can crusade 1n the anme of fraternal eo-operation and international advancement tvhile he manipulates by his diplomacy
the power relationshirs as they presently exist.

Thus the

plaee of France as a front-rank power takes on a messianic
necessity and it gives moral justittcation to Gaull1sm. 61
'The cause which de Gaulle urge. 1s one that cannot be rationally
opposed.

Although he claimed to be acting for the sake of

mankind rather than espoust.ng a particular ideology, this in

itself wu

aft

ideol08t.cal appeal.

A typical _ample of biJI

ideolog1cal dealal of ..pausing an ideological po.lt~ 18
the staCetnellt nede at the Ihd.:veralty ot- Mexico t.n1964where

he saidt

"Oft.

cause, that ot-.nJdnd, one neeessity.

tba~

of world progress; and consequently, that of aid to all nations
that seek it for their development; one duty, that of peace-·
the•• are, for mankind, the very conditions of its 11fe."62

The ultimate justification for this goal of his foretgn polley

"vas advaneed by de Gaulle at the end of 1962 t
In the face of the totalitarian venture raised aga1nst

the i>1eet. social libel1:y, equality and ffttem1ty--

oursued as a result of the economic and cultural
r)t'~.s of the people as a. whole aM of t.he acelOh of
a falr and viforOUG State--are tndeed vital, not only
to

en8~

the UIIt.ty of the Mtlon. but 81ao •• present

the opposite side with a striking and appealing demonstration of a way of life more fruitful than theirs

tJ

I'

•••

1

•••

l'

U

••

= ••...

8 . n• • • • • • •

t

61Maurtac, ~ vAY"~t pp. 62-63.
62.,farch U5, 1961,.; quoted in ~1auriaet Jl1t

vaulls,

p. 208.
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and to hllSt8'.n among them this tranlfot"matlon. perhap~
already beg~, which is the true hope for peace,c)3
This 1s a task which France can perform; henee it is
a task which de Gaulle, seeped as he is 11'1 politieal inslght
and diplomatic know-how, has chosen for France in a bid to
re;s4in international prestige.

As de

Caulle explained:

lilt

is her genius, it is her voeation to assume moral leadershlp;
in any case to point the way,"64 A month later de Gaulle
declared:
Externally our country haa a human task to accomplish,

and it must give the lignal, l1'ft1lt take the initiatlve

11'1 the eo-operation that more favored peoples like
ounatves ws t bring to those who are· not or who are
less so, and who comprise thelr.at majorIty of the
earth's inhabitants. I~ t.s inthf.s tllsk that, when
the occasion arises, if' it should present itself in
a conference, "ranee witt. t ~.l'eat,taka tho 1niliative. 65
Later on the same day he continued:

fI • • •

it must be Franee

tha.t sets the example in this matter, that takes the 1,n1ti-

stlva with her three great partners in the world--a task
she ls disposed to undertake, as soon as she finds the oppot:'-

tunity to do so. ,.66
The French pol1.<,y of co-operation with the nations of
Asia, Africa, and Latin

Ame~iea

.seema to be directed toward the

maintenance and extension of Freneh influence without the
b

I

• •

...

63 de Gaulle, ''Message to the Newly Elected French
A•••biy, If Dec_ber 11, 1962, t'tliu Addrtlll!, fh 205,
64
.
Speech at Blot.s, May 9, 1959; quoted ttl Mauriac,
~ Qulls. ., •.. 196.
.
65";;,peech

'I:!Ilour,
8 t""
:)8 tnt -I"

J une

S , 14'\59
'?
;

T"'4~
quo t au..iI 1.n~.

66 Speech at Aurl11ic, June 5, 1959; quoted in lh1d.
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expense or tfOrld disfavor assoclated

wl~~

colonialism.

The

projeeted di?lomatic initiatives haVG been directed partic-

ularly toward those areas where

~he

influence

o~

the Wast

(and the United States in particular) has been the most extensive.
at

Thus de Gaulle has entered u?on a diplomacy aimed

bulld1n~

his prestige 1n the emarging world in order to

achieve a dogree ot bargaining power at world conferences. 67
Regarding the East-Wast oonflict, by developing cooperatlon8l'lOna the European .natlons. the hope 1s
ultimate 1es8en1ng of Cold War t4lins1ona.

an

fOI:

Looking to tba future,

de Gaulle 8Ilvlalou the w1thdrawal of Russ1An ta:'OOps from tile
~aster,n

~st

nations with

tn.

proximat:. 1iastern

conaommltantlntagratLon of the

Wrop4an

nations (notably Poland.

CxeehO{llo~ald.a.

ad Hungary) iDto the flcoaomlc cOIUUnlt1.

The8e~ountI'1.s

would":aaa1n the f1:'8. _oroue of thau sov-

ereignty and thus they would be able to reassociate them-

selves with Europe economically and perhaps even politically
'rbe Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Treaty would be obsolete and
would disappear.

With the withdrawal of American and Rus.ian

troops, France and RUlsia could undertake massive economic
co-operation and mutual advancement. o8

This policy of eo-operatlon and mutual advancement
was clearly explained recently by the General:
,

t

i7t • V1dyasova, "nispute Simmers between U.S.A. and
','mlti0l1l1 Alflw (Mc;)$cow). Vol. 9 (Decembar,
1:;6..1>.: p. o.

F!a~ce, tI

68Brzezinski, Iti~urope to the Urals, U p. 13.

t
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In this general context, France's policy 1s
prompted as much as possible by common sense and-let us speak plainly--by modesty_ She is seeking to
aec~l"llsh what she believes to be !,asaible and what
is within their scope. Taking advantage of the ~on.

tinuity and the stability that her institution3()]:o\lii.la,

France has, in order to carry out her international
action, set herself three chief goals, which are.
moreover, lb\kad to each other:
First, to free herself, with regard to the overseas peoples which way. formerly under her jurisdiction,
af the political, economic and military obligations
which she used to have in those countries and which
world evolution rendered sore u••lass and more costly
each day, and to transform her relations with them
into a contractual and regular cooperation that will
benefit bothdavaloP'ldft1 aAd friend,hip aftd that .a.,
fl!rthormore. be extended to other countries.
Oft tM eth... hand, to. cot'llrt.buta to tbe COBstructlon of Europe in the field of polities, of
def.e. aDd of eoon"t .. that the eXll••• len altdaetlon
of this ensemble may a d French prosperity and $ecurity
and,
the .... tt... re-e,tabll.h the poe.t.bi11tr
of a European balance vis .... a. ..vis the 8sstern countr es.
F{1t&11,. to coordinate the er_tloa . f a "el'll
national force with our scientific, technical. economic
and ,oclal pre~..... 1n that orde..--w1thln the f7....
work ()f a necessary alli.ance and with the hope of! an

a.

international detent..... shoald be able,

wba~~r

happens, to play our own part in our destlny.o

.. .. .. .

.

.. -Ii:

..• -,

••

t ......

I. . ..... .

a

69de Gaulle, flSlxeh Press Conference. 1t Vay 15, 1')62,
tlAjg;: Mtb:!J'I!!, pp. 112.73.
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CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL Mm:tODS AND POLICIES

or

DE GAULLE

In hls t!fIaf2f,.r•• de Gaulle reached tne Conclusioa that
"perhaps France la DOW confronting ona ofthoae IIODI8nC. 1ft
h~.tor.y

when a people 1. offered a deatlny greal

to the grav1ty of .it. ordeal.H1

~

pcoperaion

Ttlla aspect of Gau11,u,

diplomacy i. regarded by Aron to be, fundamental.

Acc_cU.DI.

to his concept of history, de Gaulle haa been able to aka

a dlstlnctlon between tong-range polit1cal persepetive and
present political facts.

The long-range view 18 tha per-

arleetlve of Freneh history as a whole and 01. the hlstol')' of

civilization 111 lts entirety_ Day-to-day oceurencaa a¥e DOt
always found by de Gaulle to be 1ft complete confo=1.ty

~

the

long-range p.spective. but when the two cot.rlci.de, when the

present Joi,ns with the hi8tor1cal. then de Gaull. bel1ew..
that eV8l7 wol'd. and aveC')'
that

h1st~ical bac~

ies~urewll1

be pJ:'ojectad aaalut

and will meet wlth great auc.es ••

In those cases Where the pre.ent situation does not conform
•

d.

r

"

•

•• ,

•

111
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to what de Gaulle bftlieve8 that history dictates, this commentator argued, then he is inclined to stde with history and
close his eyes and mind to the contemporary reallty.2

Thus

in these moments when the present dlverges from the practice

of the past. when politics strays too far from the path
wall-trod by history, then the moment of difficulty appears
for the General.

When politieal maneuvers must be carried

on without clear historieal imperatives, when the i88ues are
less decisive or the circumstances less compelling. then
French foreign polley may appear tto be hNltarat and alaoat
,~

ill-at-e.se.

the most fundamental aspect of da Gaulle's

polittcal t.lent "St8

Oft

torleal framewGt''k1 h. has

b1. ablllly to aot withln
demonat~.tad

all

hi...

• patlene wl1li.:npe••

to walt fo'r the taO.1 favorabl_ tDOIMftt, to pre,." fO'rthat
moment, and to ACe at tbe ...t t.v••able ttme. 3

.poken of the vacillaciem of h'ancef...

De Ceul1e hal

graatnee. to .decllM throustwut tlte cencurl.. , heba refused
to con.lderlntetmatloaal Hla'lOfts t" Nne of . . ateI'Ml
dualiaml rather be haa lon, anticipated the .....ene. of

the P'reneb ·senlul of!'et.....l'· froM am14 the c,haos of eontemporuy vorl" pol1t1es. 4 Thlsl'lOtion.' pi..' .... fow: time.

of striving for durability, of avoiding pos.lble

p . . . .ture

burial, of .alting fOW hi.Cory to aRfold It.elf and for events
d

r

I.

I

tI

•

e

2Aron , "Pol it leal Methods of de Gaulle," p. 22.
3~•• pp. 27.28.
4Kelly. ('French Restoration of History, U p. 648.
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to be molded. is fundamental to de Gaulle's method.
clt~d

Aron has

the tol1cnd.Jl, a. the IDOst .i.plflcant thought fl'Oat the

General'.

tr""'11 "In

human enterprises it sometimes happens

that by vlrcue of • lona.drawaout effort Ofte suddenly ohCalns

'wom dive.,.e 4ftd dU'P8rate ele. .ts,,,5

a _l.q•• lmpetu

Tba' de Gaull. believes

~ch

a momeatp...ently eKists

in r ..enob hl.stosy I.. beyoaci '81'i.oua que.t1cm.

Ha .al1ed

att. .tlon to ahe opportvne .....e of the pr_.t t t . Sa a

r __ t pra•• eonf.....,••

,belt.

. But ",happens tbau... ince
Prtute.'. positi.on
has consider"hly changed, Her new institutions put her
in a posit'" to wlsh add to deC. Her lntnnal development bring. her prosperity and gives her aeces. to
1,1\. m.Mn8 ol~. She bas r ..torad her CU'.I'l'8lleYf
her flnance..... her balance of trade. to sueh an ext __
thee, f'ft)DI tJUJI atandpolbt. a:he no longer need. ..,....
but to the contrary she finds herself receiving requeets
fa. ~ sWeat abel· 80, far from borrowing from others,
particularly from the Americana. she is paying back,

her deb•• to .... and "..,. _ CJOeaalaa 18 p'4ntlns ~hem
c....'" facd"lt.ut.ea. She hal
I.ftt:o ..,...
et:atloB be. . . . .Statu 1:he eyat.· of col_tatloft

eras"""'''

which _he 0 . . . .,,11«1 .. her At.ri.eaa ceftteOli_ ... ,
t • ... fll's. tu. lit . . . .rt. . ot a eenhrY••he I.e

pM".

l1vf..t.ra cap1. .
rruc. la ....rnlal"l her
f.-eM. 1e equlppiaa t ' - henetf with maieert.el
C.lc)" t. Wldel'tak1lt1 to . .ow henelt wl.th her own
4~l.e 'orea. She hu tleand away the clouds which

.....s

were SUI"I'O\1adilta . . . ,..l~ the COft8h'UOti.oft of
Sun,. ancl i. Wadertaklaa th18 lI"eat tuk Oft the baals
of reali,&les. be,.~
laaiaa wlt'.h the aett1aaup of the
eeoaoml.e oOtl'flDUDlty b" ,lvf..alJ. together "ith GeIwafty,
4ft eX&'llft. of the N,1rmS.ags of polttieal ooeperall.
aNi· by Wie•• lag thit she wishe. Co be Fraace wt.llIta
4 ~: Wlllch . . . t be EaI'opea. 0.. _gala the
naelena1 and tftIau.tlonal condlClon of out' e.Ufttl')'
1"M.bl.. 18.8 ... 1... what it used to be. Row lould
the terms and conditions of her relations with the
United States fall to. be altered thereby? . All the
more 10 linea the United States, on ita side ••s regards
•

f ••

d t

f,

I,

I

;

I

£

'

82
ttl owrt VCOblems. 1. """ex-goinl gnat chanl" whleh
-.dlfy the chancter of haS-Ollie .olWarity which.

slDce the laat World War, hal marked It. relations

w1th France. 6

n,.

concept of IX'tlEl for which there 1s no precise

definition or translat10n is also basic to Gaullism and tts
approach to world polities.

It involves the refusal to

cournit one'. self openly to a particular policy before the
opportune tlme.

This ambls.,"Uity 1s

no~;

tr.e same as mystery,

sinee it 1s not activity carried on with no apparent 1ogie;
rather 1t 18 an approach that is quite rational and very
lbis 1s the political art at not detining
the luture until the future dafines 1ts.1f. 7 As early as

well-planned.

the 1930's, de Gaulle regarded a mastery 01 this lRlI'U:S as
A

neces.ary element of leader.hlp'
But though there 1$ something In what we eal1 a

'nalUl'al gt.ft of authorlty' whloh eanaot .. acqllll'M,
but comes t~ the innermost being of some indlvlduals,
aad V4I'W ill ...h. the... are a180 a numb....f cona'..'
and neees8ary element. on which it il possible to lay
one t , flng 8W l and these can .. acqulwed or deyeloped.
The true lead8l!". l1ke the great artist, 1s a man with
aJ'l tahem 1)"",...1t" which 00 ba stnagth.ad and
exploited by the exereise of h1. craft.
Fint aftd forem08tl thel'. caa be DO pre.ll,8
without mystery! for fam liarit1 breeds CCfttempt •••
In • .,.1fta this I. do·

ItO'

M4l1

tbat he .... .hu.' hlma.lf

away 1n an 1vory tower, remote from. and 1naceesslble
tq. hlsaubol'cU...'... On the. tontra.,., it ... 18 to
influence men t tf minds. one musf ob86'tVe them carefully
ad _tee it <t1. .1' thac each.hM be_ _..ked oul fnm
among his lell0W8, but only on condition that this
g088 vllb. a datft'mlDation . . alve ItOthiftl away, te
•

'cte

cault.,

l·iljAl' Ada".I's.

"Eighth PI'~sl COllfel'tDCe. It July 29 II 1963.
p. 2~4.

'Luthy. "Pose and Poliey," pp. 561-62.

hold 1n reserle some piece ot: seeret knowled~e whieh
may at any ma.hllnt tDtervene, and the more eftectlvely
front being in the nature of a surprise,lI
De Gaulle further explained that diplomatic flexibllity
required the acceptance of the sttuatlon

4. it actually exilts.

Evidence of the military mind are obvlous where the General
has condemned the deductton of solutions from abstract principles and bas expressed hie deep

ml.t~8t

ot rigid ideologies

¥bleh blnd one's hands and curtail the freedom to
De

NfttNVeT.

Gaulle has expressed his preference to plan aetion in the

light ot contingencles and the nature and circumstances of
the given 8!tuatton. 9
A falr appraisal of de Caulle"

foreign poliey must pay

particular attention to the actions and gains of this polley;
it must look beneath the surtace of h1a tltatementa. realubg

$_

that de Gaulle w111 often do leemtDgly tcnltradlctOl'y th1ng.
at the

time or over a peJ.tl.od of 7ear.a.

Thls is se beeause

of the CaullJ.at belief that a· stat••·n141'l mult have many irons
in the fue at the aame time, be mult be able to
use that one Which 1.1
and el.&'C1.It1l8taDeu.

aglJ,tkaH'

u

'Il1O& t

and

ChoCUUl

pract1cal dapend1n, on the tl_

tbJ.s practice haa be. . descr1.bed as

1&

.,s.. .dI. ram.

IQIUil'IMllliD,.t or lA 41.a1

It

has been . .,t.ted

adopt
• If •

~

ta the paat AI IUl 1nteat;lonal attem,t to
tho particular circumstanc.s and to re~.e. policy

..., .

b' •

3da Gaulle, lJli.

91111.11., p. 98.

idu Ql..I1ta SWC4 •

l'). SS.

if

M.

b
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when that: poliey 1s dlscovered to be incapable olsuccess .10
This

dete~Jinatlon

to maintain a fleKlble positloa would

account for the desire of de Gaulle to cultivate friendship
with

4S

many nations as possible and to carry on

on the most extensive scale possible,

negotlat~s

In th1a way he has

hoped to k.eep as many alternatives open to htm

ltece.aary
and desirable 1n promoting his international .IPlratloaa. ll
q

One other element essential to thi. de. ire of ..intatning

a flexible position i. the avoidance of all lona-rana8 cammltmentsJ to do

80

demands an attitude of r •••~. a dl,.

lomatic silence When

s11en~e

is demanded,

De Gaulle explained

th1s aspect of his pol1tlcal technique very urly 1a hI..

political career:
This attitude of reserve demands, as .. t:'u18. a
eorr_ponding eeOllOmy of words and gestures. No doubt
these things are of thequrfaoe only, but they play
a lat."ge pare in determ1nlh.g the reaction of the crowd.
There would even seem to be soma relatlonahlp betweeD
a man's inner foree and h1s outward seeruW. No ex-

perienced soldier has

of .ppoarana.....

eVErr

underrated the Importance

Sobriety of speech auppl1$s a useful contrast
to theatricality of manner. Nothing more enhaftees
authority than ailenee. It 1s the crownLftg virtue of
the It'I01t8. the refuge of the weak, the 1IlO4uty of the
proud, and pride of the humbL., the prudence of the
wll•• and tne 8.se ot tools. The man who 1. moved by
desire or fear 18 naturally led to seek ",e11.£ 1ft
words. If ~e ylelds to the temptation it 1. because
by ftCilf.Dlt~~ his passion or hi. terror he can come
to arms w t t em. To speak 1s to dilute one's
thoughts. to ~ive vent to one's ardor, in sbort, to
di.sipate oneTs strength, whereas, what action
•

t

b

n Iii.

16

•

lOnuverger.

"M4ft

of the 19th or 21st Century. n p. xv.

11Maertdl., ImP'ISI~11 Alll. pp. 15-16.

8S

demand. is concentration. Sllenee 1s a neC9!Sary preliminary to the ordering of one's thoughts. l
Yet by de Gaulle's own diagnosis in thls same fundamental work, the statesman and the soldier bring to a similar
ttlsk very different charaeters, methods. and anxieties.

The

statesman prefers to seek hi. goal in a roundabout way, prefers
to seek a long-range solution, through trickery and calcu-

latton.

Thue it would

be characteristic

man to be quite flexible.

of the great states-

The soldier, however, prefers to

avoid complex definition of problems in favor of seeing the
immed1.ate situation 1ft clear view--a situation which peftlits

control and simple resolution.

Thus it 1.s characteristic

of the military mentality to demonstrate great foree, vigor.
and intransigence when necessary.t3

Brzezinski has 8Xplalned

this aspect of de Gaulle's method as the result of political
neceseity.
means.

France has defin1te poliey goels but only

liml~ed

This gap between end and means has dictated a posture

of obstinate insistenee on its point of vtew.

14

This aspect of Gaul1ist diplomacy has been criticised
quite severly by Taylor.

He contended that such stiffness

and lack of enthusiasm for dialogue in particular situations
1. a manifestation of weakness, a manifestation that this
8k111ed dlplomacist

sh~ld

realize and avoid.

According t.)

this criticism. France can only lose by instilling any deep
• ••

I

[

~ g.f. .tlla ~W9"h pp. S8.59.
13de Gaulle, lbI. JWaI gt .sba S.m. p. 106.
llde Gaulle. IllI

14Bnezinski, "Europe to the Urals. *1 p. 14.
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resentment in the minds of the French allies. IS

But in all

fairness this criticism must be considered against the opposing

De Gaulle ls attempting to impose leadership

vlewpoint.

upon a disorganized and traditionally divided entity; he 1s
attempting this on

~40

levels:

domestic and international.

The chiet vehicle of this unity is the charisma of his own
personality_

He appeals to fear of the Europeans; fear of

:Joviet domlnation; fear of dom1nation by the United States;
fear of losing their right to gevem themselves.

But he

must also appeal to their national pride and to mobiliz.
their national ambitlons.

He can only do this if he ex-

emplifies great strength and force of personality.
the gamble whieh de Gaulle must accept. 16

This 1s

Gaullist political philosophy according to some commentators i8 more easlly deflned by what it rejects in contem~)ot'ary

Western pollties than by the concrete proposals

advanced by the French.

Hhether this evaluation 1s valid or

not 1" of no Significance to a consideration of de Gaulle's
methods_

The fact that this estimation 1.s projected, however,

ls considerably tmportant.

De Gaulle realizes that h1story

has emerged for a very long period and that the future w111

be equally long_

Therefore he is not driven to agree with

what he finds distasteful

to his French nationalism.

No

allies are required to say no to proposals that are contrary

,.

. .r. .

$

$

lSTaylor, "The Long NATO Crisls," p. 20.
16nu 1.z1nga, 'J1'vlhlch way t~ltrope, If p_ 48S.

L

31
to the Freneh interest; da Gaull. would ratht1t'

~fQr

to

walC-out the developments of the unforeseeable future, he
em!.y will compromt.sa wban Prance atands to 881n.17

One addltlQhal laetor that 1s very hard to analyze and
I)srhap. should not even be considered as an element of
de Jaulle's dlploeati.c technique 1. the extra"l'dl.n4ry flood luck
W'h.t1't~

that the GeneY41 has had oval' the ,..411'8.

tb1. good

fortune 18 the reeult of exc.,ttonalty well-tuned political

sanses or lfthe .ucce•••• that bave accompanied Caulll;t
C1:'lC1

aavon bas I'esulted by accidsnt, the tact l"emaln. eluu: the

result. have been extrao1:-dlnary.18

Garholm ha. described

tho unu.ual Rood luck Chat da Gaulte bas had 1ft d•• ling wteh
cor,rf;lurd.8ts 1n g..u4Il and with 1:be Sov1at Un1.on 1ft ttartlcular. l9

Luthy

~t'rayed

of colonialism.

thla a8pect of Gault1•• agatnat tbe baekg1'O\md

As he noted, the loss of the French empire

'{<1hlch would have been a catastrophic blow to most political
re;::lmes has been transf'or:ned by de Gaulle into the very

C,:J.~.tse

of rrench presti3e in the underdeveloped wo~ld.20
One last technique should ;'0 note(t; and
tho most: charncterlstic aspect of Caull1.sm.

t~1is

is :':0X"haps

\\'hen a problem

t:t,pears to be appal"sl'ltly i.nsoluable or the solution seems to

he rtosslh1e only at n very high cost, the solution
• •

•

.

b

........

tH1S

..

l't..uthy, "Pose and Policy," P. S69.

lBAron • "Political Methodl of de Gaulle." p. 24.
19Garhold. "Europe as

4,

GrUcP.e... " p. 225.

2Owtby, "Pose and Polley, If p. 572.

generally been to

ttt~~il

tha

~.tlttett

at the sumnlt level that de

~aulle

to a h1:!,her. lQvel; it i.
feels the most a.t Gase and

it is here that he 1. least ~ressured by public oplnlon.!l

":oncarnlng this aapact of his overall diplomacy, de Gaulle
relatedt
In any case France took note of thl:3 outcome
with composure. Aut, in her eyes, what was necessary
yesterday will still be ne~ess4ry tomo~ow. The

detente, the controlled disarmament of strategic
weapona. the cOOperatIon ot ~4el1.prov1ded States in the

develo)j)lltlllt of those wh1ch are not remain, as much as
evaI', the ~oall that th.e other world powers owe it to
tnamaelvea and to the universe to accomplish together.
As for ourselves. we are disposed to return to this
course. But also, we belleve that 1n order to follow
thl~ course, methOdical &Jtapf) of diplomaey are worth mora

than tumultuous exchana~1 of pub11c speeehea or tha
passionate debates 1n the Tlnited ~lationst whieh alas,
ue DOt united.. On the bases t which a reasonab l e

pranaration will en.able us petha:pe to lay down. 'Franee

could) whea. the t1r.nG coaes, cons1der the rGO~ of
thts Pari.f) Conte!'en':!e which2~e had decided to hola a.nd
Which could Dot take place.
De Gaulle apprec1ates 1nternational politics for '''hat
he believes that it really

refUMd to allow himself

to

un

a iarne of

po~;er.

He

has

be led astray by the haughty

cla.i.lnsand ldaa11at1.c a1ms to tvhi.eh the great powers pledge

thellaelvee.

Hs regards 1nternati.onal or~an1zations as the

concr1vancu of the ICNt powers to les1.t1mlze their

p~ver

polltt.cs, and tho Genel'al has determined that he '14111 play
1\18 hand in th1G same game. 23
•

1

••

His actions. as Taylor noted,
J

r

••

T' ,

•

'I

211\1:'01'1. apolitical Hethods of Oe Gaulle." p. 24.
22de Gaulle. "Address Outlining the Prinelples of French
Foreign Policy, II Hay 31, 1960. fl.ljgr A"d'!II'" p_ 77.
23Luthy, HPose and Policy, U p. 566.

.

39

cone_ning the organization of Europe. have consistently

reflected against consultations carried on through

c~~plex

1nstitu'ional frameworks and alphabetical agencies; instead
he t1&8 preferred to base his actions on a more cla.ssical
diplomatic style. 24

"£hroughout his political

have remalned true to this

ca~eer.

de Gaulle 'a sympat:des

t~adltional

diplomacy which placed

particular ..,baals on the notion of a power balanee.
substut1al

alte~.tlon.

Although

have been made in the former balan.ce-.

the 014 Concert of Europe baa been replaced by a new World
I.;oncert giving. role to the United States, China, and perhaps
India ... Surope stUI remains the domiDant actor (if not the

domlnantforce).

thole nations wh14h have global power a.nd

global com.itments must assume their proper responsibilities.
I'hGY must negotlat.e

international peace with one another and

make treati••

themselvea that will guarantee this

peacca.

SlIlOD$

It 1s only after thesa agreements have been negotiated

by experts in.

.~cret ~hat

they

legi.slatut:>es and to the publie.

sho~ld

be revealed to

This has beEln the approach

recommended by Franee during the Fifth r:epubllc.

And it is

in this context that Gaul1ist foreign policy rouet be seen. 2S
Any

cooperation among the nations, even that of

f~tlonal
•

£ It.

]

A.

purely

or teehniaal nature, invariably involves political

• 1..

~

.11 .••

_._*

.....

9()

calculations and has poli.tical consequences.

'Thus de Gaulle

has repeatedly st'ressed that only properly constttutad t

nati.onal, political autho1:1tles are eapable of assuming this

responsibility Which is demanded by internatlonal politles. 26
By personalizing the foreign policy of rrance, de t~at111e

has taken a long stride toward efJt4bllshtng a diplomatic
fra~n~

that ,...ld allow hlln to implement his objeet1vss.

1!Iet:i.Dg .d.lat_al1y, he
s1t'1<':ltlons.

u

able to avoid tJI'Idealrable

He has chosen to remai.n ln isoLation wherever

he helleved his position to be weak; he has chosen this path
when he knew that his position was strong;.

On the one hand

he reared disa.ster; on the other hand, he never has conceded

what has not been necessary to manifest.

The other nations

of the world serve as the elevator on which rJe Gaulle hopes
to rise to ""orld prO!l1inoncc.

And if' de fiaulle contlnuelS

t~

follow. traditional diplomatiC course, and if he should
.tI.(:h:leve th.c

po~ition

to

~-.1hich

he as?ires, th.cn hla next: move

l10uld be to atter-I',t to implement the damisc of the formerly

::rreat pm4'crs. 27
Th,is is the Ciaullist game; this is the lnternation':J.l

scene as it is seen through the ayes of the General.
objectives and

~thods

are ty)1icnlly his o'm1.

Pc

The

he11ev:.ls

that he must lead.

This has been his obsession throughout

his Gntire career.

Prior to the Second

...

•

j

I

,

w •

26Fumlss. nGrand Design," ?

..

~"orld ~,,~a.r
k

t

i

..

he mado
r .....

164.

27noffman, !'De Gaulle. l~urope. Atlantic Alliance, n pp .20-21.
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Tn those earl; days. he o:zemplified chartlct('lristic

stn~e.

rnr.ost~ht
'J

'''hen he

~'7rote

summt~."t·"·
.. ."

this

of hiG ideal of V!eder-

• '" .whatever orders the lender may give, th~.;}1 must he
swathed in the robes of nobility. Ue n:lUst aim high.
ShO'ltl that he has vision, act on the grand scele, tlnd
so establish his author2.ty over the generalit)' of men
who splash 1.n shal1()li1 water. Ho 'mtlSt personify '::.on. ...

tempt for contingencies. and leave it to his subordinates to be bogged down in detail. He must part
tftMI hila all,t:h4t _c.. of nl~llft~ and lea. . it ~8
the htJn'td'fUCI IMt"f1.du2tls to he c!rcumopect c:t1d wat"'Y. "",,
-,0'".. ·.'

.,. ht It

#

1 It.

"

¢J

','tn.

,

Ie

n

•

'11 t

f
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